Republic V Sereno Digest 3h4k1
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Republic v. Maria Lourdes Sereno, GR 237428, May 11, 2018, Tijam, J. FACTS: From November 1986 to June 1, 2006, respondent Sereno served as faculty of UP-COL, initially as temporary faculty member from Nov 1986 to Dec 31, 1991, and thereafter as a permanent faculty member until her resignation therefrom on June 1, 2006. As regular faculty member, Sereno was paid by the month by UP. From October 2003 to 2006, while employed at UP-COL, Sereno concurrently was employed as legal counsel of the Republic in two international arbitrations: 1) PIATCO v. Republic and 2) Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide v. Republic (PIATCO cases). Sereno’s Personal Data Sheet (PDS) also details her engagement for various government agencies, particularly as legal counsel from 1994-2008 for OP, OSG, MIAA etc. and Deputy Commissioner of the CHR. Despite having been employed at UP-COL from Nov 1986 to June 1, 2006, the record of the UP HR Development Office (UP-HRDO) only contains the SALN for 1985, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, and 2002 filed by Sereno. On the other hand, the records of the ombudsman reveal that there is no SALN filed for 1999-2009 except for the SALN ending December 1998 which was subscribed only in August 2003 and transmitted by UP-HRDO to ombudsman only on Dec 16, 2003. Also, despite having been employed as legal counsel of various government agencies from 2003 to 2009, there is no showing that Sereno filed her SALNs for these years, except the SALN ending Dec 31, 2009 which was unsubscribed and filed before the Clerk of Court only on June 22, 2012. After serving as professor at UP-COL until 2006 and thereafter as practitioner including as legal counsel for Republic until 2009, Sereno submitted her application for associate justice of SC in July 2010. In of her application, she submitted to the JBC her SALN for 2006 which bears no stamp received by UP-HRDO and was signed on July 27, 2010. According to Sereno, JBC considered her nomination for associate justice as that of a private practitioner and not as government employee. Recently in a letter to Office of Recruitment Selection and Nomination (ORSN) of JBC, she explained that such SALN was intended to be her SALN for July 27, 2010. She ed the SALN form and forgot to erase the year “2006” printed thereon and she was not required by ORSN to submit a subscribed SALN. The only SALNs available on record and filed by Sereno were those for 1985, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, and 2002 or eleven SALNs filed in her 20-year government service in UP. No SALNs were filed from 2003 to 2006 when she was employed as legal counsel for the Republic. Neither was there a SALN filed when she resigned from UP-COL as of June 1, 2006 and when she supposedly re-entered government service as of August 16, 2010. On August 13, 2010, Sereno was appointed by Pres. Noynoy as justice. When the position of CJ was declared vacant in 2012, the JBC announced the opening for application. The announcement was preceded by an en banc meeting where the JBC agreed to require the applicants for CJ to submit, instead of the usual submission of SALNs for the last 2 years of public service, all previous SALNs up to Dec 31, 2011 for those in government service. The announcement said that applicants with incomplete documentary requirements will not be interviewed or considered.
On June 25, 2012, JBC enbanc resolved not to require incumbent SC justices who are candidates for CJ to submit other documentary requirements. Instead, it required them to submit only the SALNs, bank waiver, med cert, lab results, and PDS. On July 2, 2012, Sereno accepted several nominations from the legal and evangelical community for CJ and submitted to ORSN her SALNs for 2009, 2010, and 2011. On July 20, 2012, the JBC in its en banc meeting deliberated on the candidates with incomplete documentary requirements. Their deliberation reveal: 10. Justice Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno The Executive Officer informed the Council that she had not submitted her SALNs for a period of ten (10) years, that is, from 1986 to 2006. Senator Escudero mentioned that Justice Sereno was his professor at U.P. and that they were required to submit SALNs during those years. Because there were several candidates with incomplete documentary requirements, JBC en banc agreed to extend the deadline for submission of lacking requirements to July 23, 2012 and those who fail to complete the requirements are to be excluded. On July 20, the ORSN, thru its then Chief Atty. Pascual, inquired as to Sereno’s SALNs for 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1999(*acc to Sereno), although Atty. Pascual testified in the congressional hearing for Sereno’s impeachment that he had asked for 1995-2006. In response, Sereno sent a letter of even date, saying that most of her government records in the academe are more than 15 years old and thus it is infeasible to retrieve those files. The UP had cleared her already of academic/istrative responsibilities and thus considered her SALN requirements to have been met. She says that since she had a break in government service from 2006 until her appointment as justice on 2010, and that since she had been cleard, she reqests that the requirements she needs to comply with be viewed as that from a private sector before her appointment to the government again in 2010. But the letter was neither examined by JBC nor deliberated upon by JBC enbanc or the Execom. They could not produce any minutes of the meeting that the JBC deliberated on the letter. On the scheduled date of interview on July 24, despite Sereno’s submission of only 3 SALNs, Atty. Pascual prepared a report where Sereno was listed as applicant No. 14 with an annotation that she had “COMPLETE REQUIREMENTS” and a note stating “Letter 7/23/12- considering that her government records in the academe are more than 15 yo, it is reasonable to consider it infeasible to retrieve all those files.” On August 6, 2012, ORSN prepared a list of the 20 candidates, Sereno included, vis-à-vis their SALN submissions. Opposite her name was an enumeration of the SALNs she submitted- 2009, 2010, and 2011, and the same excerpt from her July 23, 2012 letter. On Aug. 13, 2012, JBC voted on who to include in the shortlist and on the same day transmitted to the president its nominations for CJ. Included therein was Sereno. On August 24, 2012, Sereno was appointed by President Noynoy. On August 30, 2017 5 yrs later, an impeachment complaint was filed by Atty. Larry Gadon against Sereno with the Committee on Justice (COJ) of HoR for culpable violation of the constitution etc. and for failing to make truthful declarations in her SALNs. This was endorsed by several
of the HoR and was found sufficient in form and substance. The COJ held several hearings to determine probable cause. During these hearings, it was revealed that Sereno purportedly failed to file her SALNs while she was a member of UP-COL and that she filed her SALN only for 1998, 2002, and 2006. Justice Peralta, as resource person being then the ex-officio chairman of JBC, claimed that during the JBC deliberations in 2012, he was not made aware that Sereno submitted incomplete SALNs nor that Sereno’s letter of July 23, 2012 to JBC was ever deliberated upon. This was confirmed by Atty. Cayosa and Atty. Capacite, who emphasized that based on the rubber stamp received, only the offices of the JBC regular , ORSN, and OEO were furnished copies on the letter and by Atty. Pascual. This spawned two incidents: 1) proposal of COJ for the SC to investigate on the JBC proceedings on the nomination of Sereno as CJ, and 2) letter dated Feb. 21, 2018 of Atty. Mallari to OSG requesting that the latter, in representation of the Republic, initiate a quo warranto against Sereno. Hence this petition. OSG files this case for quo warranto against the incumbent CJ Sereno, to declare her ineligible to hold CJ for failing to regularly disclose her SALN as a member of the career service prior to her appointment as justice, and later as CJ, in violation of the constitution, anti-graft Law, and the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. OSG claims that quo warranto is the proper remedy to question the validity of Sereno’s appointment. He claims that quo warranto is available as a remedy even as against impeachable officers like Sereno. He claims that Sereno failed to show that she is a person of proven integrity which is an indispensable qualification for hip in the Judiciary under S7(3), Art. VIII. Sereno claims thato n the strength of S2, Art. XI, and Mayor Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, Cuenco v. Hon. Fernan, In Re: First Indorsement from Hon. Gonzales, and Re: Complaint-Affidavit for Disbarment Against Senior Associate Justice Antonio Carpio, the CJ may be ousted from office only by impeachment. “May be removed from office” in S2, Art. XI does not signify that of SC may be removed thru modes other than impeachment. The clear intent of the framers was to create an exclusive category of public officers who can be removed only by impeachment. She claims that she was not required to file her SALN during the time she was on official leave without pay. She continues to recover her missing SALNs and will present them before the Senate sitting as Impeachment Tribunal and not to SC considering her objections to SC’s jurisdiction. The question of whether an applicant for CJ is a person of “proven integrity” is a question constitutionally committed to JBC and is a political question. OSG cites Estrada v. Desierto and Lawyer’s League for a Better PH and Oliber Lozano v. Pres. Corazon Aquino where the SC took cognizance of a petition for quo warranto to oust an impeachable official. OSG argues that Concerned Taxpayer v. Doblada Jr. is not on all fours with this petition as it did not involve issues on qualifications to public office unlike this petition. Motions for Inhibition Sereno seeks the inhibition of 5 justices of the SC- Bersamin, Peralta, Jardeleza, Tijam, and Leonardo-De Castro. She imputes actual bias on said justices for having testified before COJ on
the impeachment complaint. Peralta’s inhibition is sought as he, being then acting ex officio chair of JBC, would have personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts and for having served as a material witness in the controversy. Tijam’s inhibition is based on his statement in a Manila Times article to the effect that if Sereno continues to ignore the impeachment process, she is clearly liable for culpable violation of the constitution. Tijam and Bersamin also wore a touch of red during the “Red Monday” protest on March 12, 2018 where judges and court employees reportedly called on Sereno to resign. De Castro is claimed to have prejudged the issue when she testified in COJ that Sereno should have been disqualified from the shortlist on of the SALNs she allegedly failed to submit. At the last minute, she seeks to disqualify Justice Martires for his purpoted insinuations during the Oral Arguments questioning Sereno’s mental fitness on the basis of her belief that God is the “source of everything in (her) life.” ISSUES: 1. Whether SC can assume jurisdiction and give due course to this petition for quo warranto against Sereno who is an impeachable officer and against whom an impeachment complaint has already been filed with HoR. 2. Whether the petition is outrightly dismissible on the ground of prescription. 3. Whether Sereno is eligible for the position of CJ a. Whether the determination of a candidate’s eligibility for nomination is the exclusive function of JBC and whether such determination is a political question outside the SC’s review powers. b. Whether Sereno failed to file her SALNs as mandated by the constitution and law, and if so whether the failure voids the nomination and appointment of Sereno as CJ. c. In case Sereno is inegligible to hold the position of CJ, whether her subsequent nomination by JBC and the appointment by the President cured such ineligibility. HELD: - NO basis for the associate justices of SC to inhibit This petition comes at the heels of the recently-concluded hearings on the determination of probable cause in the impeachment complaint against Sereno before COJ. Several of SC, both incumbent and retired, were invited, under pain of contempt, to serve as resource persons. Those who were present at the COJ hearings were armed with the requisite imprimatur of SC en banc, given that are to testify only on matters within their personal knowledge and insofar as material to the issues being heard. Sereno cites “Appear in Congress or violate Constitution” dated Dec 4, 2017, where Justice Tijam was purportedly quoted to have said that if Sereno continues to ignore the impeachment process, she is liable for culpable violation of the constitution. As for the other justices, the cause for inhibition ultimately simmers to the question of whether, in appearing and testifying before COJ, the justices are precluded from hearing and deciding this quo warranto petition. The Court answers in the negative. The right of a party to seek the inhibition or disqualification of a judge who does not appear to be wholly, free, disinterested etc. in handling the case must be balanced with the judge’s duty to
decide cases without fear of repression. The movant must thus prove the ground of bias and prejudice by clear and convincing evidence to disqualify a judge. A circumspect reading of Tijam’s statements in the Manila Times article reveals that the manifest intent of the statements was only to prod Sereno to observe and respect the constitutional process of impeachment and to exemplify the ideals of public ability. Sereno conveniently invoked only a portion of the article which suited her objective of imputing bias against justice Tijam. As to the wearing of red tie which purportedly establishes Tijam and Bersamin’s prejudice against her, there is no basis in law or in logic to establish a connection between a piece of clothing and a magistrate’s performance of adjudicatory functions. Absent compelling proof to the contrary, the red piece of clothing was merely coincidental. Rule 137, S1 does not give judges unfettered discretion to decide whether to desist from hearing a case. The inhibition must be for just and valid causes. Mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground for inhibition especially when the charge is without basis. As to voluntary inhibition, the mere fact that some justices participated in the COJ heariings does not make them disqualified. Their appearance thereat was in deference to HoR whose constitutional duty to investigate the impeachment complaint against Sereno could not be doubted. The SC en banc consented to the appearance. In fact, Justice Tijam, in his sworn statement to COJ, identified the purpose of his attendance as not to be a witness for complainant, but to accord due respect to the constitutionally established process of impeachment. The justices refused to answer the question as to whether Sereno’s acts were impeachable offenses as it was not theirs to decide but a function belonging to the Senate. A judge may decide, in the exercise of his sound discretion, to recuse himself from a case for just or valid reasons. Sereno’s call for inhibition has been based on speculations or on distortions of the language, context, and meaning of the answers the justices gave as witnesses in the COJ hearings. Justice Bersamin’s statement that “Ang SC ay hindi po maaring mag function kung isa ay diktador” is clearly a hypothetical statement. Justice Peralta’s statement in the hearing that had he been informed of the July 23, 2012 letter of Sereno, he would have immediately objected to the selection of the CJ for voting because it was a very clear deviation from existing rules is clearly a hypothetical statement. It was expressed in line with his functions as then acting chair of JBC. At the time, this petition had not yet been filed. Thus, such statement cannot amount to prejudgment of the case. Also, according to Peralta, he had no personal knowledge of the disputed facts concerning the proceedings, specifically the matters considered by the JBC in preparing the shortlist of nominees as it was the ORSN which was tasked to determine the completeness of the applicants’ documentary requirements. Justice Martires has not suggested that Sereno suffers from some mental illness. At most, his questions during the oral arguments of this case were merely hypothetical in nature. To impute actual bias based on such a brief discourse with respect to hypothetical matters is highly speculative.
In Jurado & Co. v. Hongkong Bank, the SC elucidated that a challenge to the competency of a judge may it of two constructions: 1) the magistrate decides for himself the question of his competency and his decision therein is conclusive and the other of the Court have no voice in it, 2) the challenged magistrate sits with the Court and decides the challenge as a collegial body. The SC adopted the second view. The Court sees no reason to deviate from its standing practice of resolving competency challenges as a collegial body without excluding the challenged member from participating therein. Thus, the SC denies Sereno’s motion to inhibit and Sereno’s urging that the justices deliberate and decide the matter of inhibition of the justices without the justices themselves participating in the deliberation. 1. YES. S5, Art. VIII provides that SC shall exercise original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. This Court, the CA, and RTC have concurrent jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writs including quo warranto. S7, Rule 66 provides that the venue of an action for quo warranto when commenced by solgen is either the RTC in Manila, in CA, or in SC. While the hierarchy of courts serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs, a direct invocation of SC’s original jurisdiction is allowed when there are special and important reasons therefor. Here, direct resort to SC is justified considering that the petition questions the qualification of no less than a member of SC. This petition is a case of transcendental importance and of first impression. The qualification of an incumbent CJ are being scrutinized. Sereno argues that she is an impeachable officer. Thus, quo warranto cannot be lodged against her especially when there is an impending impeachment case against her. This argument is misplaced. While both may result in the ouster of a public official, the origin, nature, and purpose of impeachment and quo warranto are materially different. Impeachment is political in nature, while quo warranto is judicial. Impeachment is a proceeding exercised by the legislative as representatives of the sovereign to vindicate the breach of trust of the people. Quo warranto involves a judicial determination of the eligibility or validity of the election or appointment of a public official based on predetermined rules. In PH, the earliest record of impeachment in our laws is the 1935 constitution. As currently worded, the 1987 Constitution added a ground as compared to the 1935, “betrayal of public trust.” Commisioner de los Reyes of the concom explained that this ground is a “catch-all phrase to include all acts which are not punishable by statutes as penal offenses, but nonetheless render the officer unfit to continue in office. it includes betrayal of public interest, inexcusable negligence of duty, abuse of power, cronyism, etc.” It is essentially a political process meant to vindicate the violation of the public’s trust. As to quo warranto, in PH, the remedies against usurpers of public office appeared in the 1900s thru Act 190. S197 of this Act provides for a provision comparable to S1, Rule 66 of RoC.
-Quo warranto and impeachment can PROCEED INDEPENDENTLY and SIMULTANEOUSLY of each other as these remedies are distinct as to 1) jurisdiction, 2) grounds, 3) applicable rules of initiation, filing, and dismissal, and 4) limitations. “Quo Warranto” is Latin for “by what authority.” Thus, it is a writ of inquiry. It determines whether an individual has the legal right to hold the public office he or she occupies. A quo warranto proceeding is an action by the government against individuals unlawfully holding an office. S1, Rule 66 reads: 1. Action by Government against individuals. -An action for the usurpation of a public office, position or franchise may be commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines against: (a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, position or franchise; (b) A public officer who does or suffers an act which, by the provision of law, constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of his office; or (c) An association which acts as a corporation within the Philippines without being legally incorporated or without lawful authority so to act. This remedy is vested in the people and not in any private individual or group, because disputes over title to public office are viewed as a public question of governmental legitimacy and not merely a private quarrel. The only time that an individual, in his own name, may bring an action for quo warranto is when he has a claim over the position in question (S5, Rule 66). Solgen, in the exercise of sound discretion, may turn down the institution of an action for quo warranto where there are valid reasons. Upon receipt of a case certified to him, he may prosecute the case or not. Quo warranto is proper to determine the right or title to the contested public office or to oust the holder from its enjoyment. In quo warranto as to offices filled by election, what is determined is the eligibility of the candidates elected while in quo warranto as to offices filled by appointment, what is determined is the LEGALITY OF THE APPOINTMENT. The title to a public office may not be contested collaterally but only directly by quo warranto. This precludes the filing of a prohibition petition to inquire into the validity of appointment of a public officer. In case of usurpation of public office when respondent is found guilty of usurping, intruding into, or unlawfully holding public office, the judgment shall include: 1) the respondent shall be ousted and excluded from the office, 2) the petitioner shall recover his costs, and 3) such further judgment determining the respective rights in and to the public office of all parties to the action. This does not include reversal of acts taken under the ostensible authority of an office. Is there forum shopping because there is already the impeachment case? The test for determining the existence of forum shopping is whether in the two or more cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights or causes of action, and reliefs sought. There is litis pendentia when there is: 1) identity of parties or at least such parties as those representing the same interests in both actions, 2) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, and 3) identity as to the two cases such that any judgment in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case.
There is res judicata or prior judgment barring a subsequent case when 1) the former judgment is final, 2) it is rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties, 3) it is a judgment or order on the merits, and 4) there is, between the two actions, identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action. Here, the causes of action are different. In quo warranto, the cause of action lies on the usurping of public office while in impeachment, it is the commission of an impeachable offense. The crux of this controversy is whether Sereno legally holds the CJ position to be considered as an impeachable officer in the first place. She is not being prosecuted here for impeachable offenses in the Articles of impeachment in HoR. While Sereno’s title to hold public office is the issue in quo warranto, impeachment necessarily presupposes that she legally holds the public office and is thus an impeachable officer. The reliefs sought are also different. In quo warranto, respondent shall be adjudged to cease from holding a public office which he is ineligible to hold. In impeachment, a conviction of impeachable offenses shall result to the removal of respondent from public office that he is legally holding. Since the complaint was referred to COJ, there is an impeachment “proceeding”, but no impeachment “case” yet. The COJ’s determination of probable cause is akin to the prosecutor’s determination during preliminary investigation. The prosecutor does not determine the guilt or innocence of accused. Thus, during preliminary investigation before the prosecutor, there is no pending case to speak of yet. Thus, there is no pending impeachment “case” that would bar the quo warranto on the ground of forum shopping. -
Impeachment is NOT an EXCLUSIVE remedy by which an INVALIDLY APPOINTED or elected IMPEACHABLE official may be removed from office. Sereno claims that she can only be removed by impeach, citing Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, Cuenco v. Fernan, In Re Gonzales, Jarque v. Desierto, and Marcoleta v. Borra. But none of these cases concerned the validity of an impeachable officer’s appointment. Whether the impeachable officer unlawfully held his office was not in issue. The principle laid down in said cases is that during their incumbency, impeachable officers cannot be criminally prosecuted for an offense that carries with it the penalty of removal, and if they are required to be of PH Bar to qualify, they cannot be charged with disbarment. The proscription does not extend to actions assailing the public officer’s title to the office he occupies. In issuing such pronouncement, the SC is presumed to be aware of its power to issue writs of quo warranto under Rule 66 of RoC. Even the PET rules provide for the remedy of either an election protest or quo warranto to question the eligibility of the president and VP, both of whom are impeachable officers. To follow Sereno’s theory that impeachable officials can be removed only thru impeachment means that a president or VP against whom an election protest has been filed can demand for dismissal thereof on the ground that it can potentially cause his removal from office thru a mode other than impeachment. This would render election protests nugatory. In fact, in Estrada v. Desierto and Estrada v. Macapagal-Arroyo, the SC took cognizance over the quo warranto filed against respondent who had taken an oath and assumed the presidency. By
entertaining the quo warranto petition, the SC determined whether president Estrada has put an end to his official status by his alleged act of resignation. -
Also, the language of S2, Art. XI does not foreclose quo warranto against impeachable officers: Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the of the Supreme Court, the of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment. If the language under consideration is plain, it is neither necessary to resort to extrinsic aids, like the records of the constitutional convention, for its interpretation. The provision uses the permissive “may” which, in STATCON, denotes discretion. “May” is indicative of a mere possibility, an opportunity, or an option. Thus, by its tenor, S2, Art. XI allows the institution of quo warranto against an impeachable officer. To subscribe to the view that appointments or election of impeachable officers are outside judicial review is to cleanse their appointments or election of any possible defect pertaining to constitutionally-prescribed qualifications which cannot otherwise be raised in an impeachment proceeding. The courts should be able to inquire into the validity of appointments even of impeachable officers. Otherwise, an absurd situation is allowed where such appointment cannot be questioned even when, for instance, the officer is of foreign nationality or, where bar hip is a qualification for an office, he fraudulently represented himself to be a bar member. Unless the officer commits any of the grounds for impeachment, he can continue discharging the functions of his office. -
The SC’s exercise of its jurisdiction over quo warranto is not violative of separation of powers. S3(1) and S3(6), Art. XI respectively provides that HoR shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment while the Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. Nonetheless, an action for quo warranto tests the right of a person to occupy a public position. While impeachment concerns actions that make the officer unfit to continue exercising his office, quo warranto involves matters that render him ineligible to hold the position to begin with. Given its nature and effect, quo warranto is unavailing to determine whether an official has committed misconduct in office nor is it proper to evaluate the person’s performance in office. Quo warranto does not try a person’s culpability of an impeachment offense. The role of the courts thru quo warranto complements separation of powers. The Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over quo warranto does not preclude Congress from enforcing its own prerogative of determining probable cause for impeachment, to transmit the Articles of Impeachment, nor will it preclude the Senate from exercising its power of impeachment. The Senate, as impeachment tribunal, cannot be expected to rule on the validity of the CJ’s appointment as this would disturb checks and balances and dilute judicial power of courts upon which jurisdiction is exclusively vested to rule on actions for quo warranto. Its ruling thereon would not
be with jurisprudential binding effect because rulings of the impeachment court, being a political rather than judicial body, do not form part of the laws of the land. The Court demarcates that an act or omission committed PRIOR to or AT THE TIME of appointment or election relating to an official’s qualifications to hold office as to render such appointment/election invalid is properly subject of quo warranto. Contrariwise, acts or omissions, even if it relates to the qualification of integrity, being a continuing requirement but nonetheless committed DURING the incumbency of a VALIDLY appointed/elected official CANNOT be the subject of quo warranto, but of something else, either impeachment, if impeachable, or disciplinary, istrative or criminal action, if otherwise. An outright dismissal of the petition based on speculation that Sereno will eventually be tried on impeachment is a clear abdication of the Court’s duty to settle actual controversy squarely presented before it. 2. NO. Prescription does not lie against the State. The rules on quo warranto, S11, Rule 66, read: Limitations. -Nothing contained in this Rule shall be construed to authorize an action against a public officer or employee for his ouster from office unless the same be commenced within one (1) year after the cause of such ouster, or the right of the petitioner to hold such office or position, arose; nor to authorize an action for damages in accordance with the provisions of the next preceding section unless the same be commenced within one (1) year after the entry of the judgment establishing the petitioner's right to the office in question. It was held that the 1-year period is a condition precedent to the existence of the cause of action for quo warranto and inaction of an officer for 1 year could be considered a waiver of his right to file the same. The reason for setting a prescriptive period is the urgency of the matter to be resolved. The government must be immediately informed if any person claims to be entitled to an office in the civil service as against another holding it so that the government may not be faced with the predicament of having to pay two salaries. But the petitioners in these past cases were private individuals asserting their right of office, unlike here where the government itself commenced the quo warranto. Thus, the one year limitation is NOT EQUALLY APPLICABLE when the petitioner is not a mere private individual, but the GOVERNMENT itself. S2 of Rule 66 reads: SEC. 2. When Solicitor General or public prosecutor must commence action. -The Solicitor General or a public prosecutor, when directed by the President of the Philippines, or when upon complaint or otherwise he has good reason to believe that any case specified in the preceding section can be established by proof must commence such action. This makes it compulsory for solgen to commence a quo warranto. A quo warranto action is a governmental function and not a proprietary function. Thus, no statute of limitations is applicable. The basic principle that “prescription does not lie against the State” which finds textual basis under Art. 1108 (4) of NCC applies in this case.
Since the remedy of quo warranto is intended to prevent a continuing exercise of an authority unlawfully asserted, no statute of limitation applies to the action. No prudent or just court would allow an unqualified person to hold public office. The Republic cannot be faulted for questioning Sereno’s qualification for office only upon discovery of the cause of ouster. Sereno was never forthright as to whether or not she filed her SALNs covering the period of her employment in UP. Recall that in response to the JBC requiring her submission of previous SALNs, Sereno never categorically said that she filed them. Instead, she cleverly hid the fact of non-filing by stating that she should not be required to submit the documents as she was considered to be coming from private practice and that it was not feasible to retrieve most of her records in the academe as they were more than 15 yo. Even up to now, Sereno has not been candid on whether she filed the required SALNs or not. The defect on Sereno’s appointment was not discernible but was deliberately rendered obscure. Thus, there can be no acquiescence or inaction on the part of Republic as would amount to an abandonment of its right to seek redress against a public wrong. 3. NO. A. NO. The SC exercises supervisory authority over JBC. This authority includes ensuring that JBC complies with its own rules. S8(1), Art. VIII reads: A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court, composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio , a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law" a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector. The power of supervision means “overseeing or the authority of an officer to see to it that the subordinate officers perform their duties.” The supervisor merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he does not lay down the rules. Essentially, the power means no more than the power of ensuring that laws are faithfully executed, or that subordinate officers act within the law. The SC’s supervisory power consists of seeing to it that JBC complies with its own rules and procedures. The JBC’s duty to recommend or nominate, although calling for discretion, is neither absolute nor unlimited. In carrying out its main function, JBC has the authority to set the standards/criteria in choosing its nominees for every vacancy in the judiciary, subject only to the minimum qualifications required by the Constitution and law for every position. While the resolution of who to nominate as between two candidates of equal qualification cannot be dictated by SC upon JBC, such surrender of choice presupposes that whosoever is nominated is not otherwise disqualified. Thus, the nomination by JBC is not an exercise of policy or wisdom as to place JBC’s actions in the same category as political questions. Questions of policy or wisdom refer to those questions which, under the constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of government. Thus, the SC has authority, as an incident of its power of supervision over JBC, to insure that JBC faithfully executes its duties as the constitution requires of it. SC has power to inquire into the process leading to Sereno’s nomination for CJ.
- Qualifications under the constitution cannot be waived or bargained away by JBC. JBC’s discretion is limited by the constitution when it prescribed qualifications. In S7, Art. VIII, among the qualifications are: (3) A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence. More than age, citizenship, and professional qualifications, the constitution is clear that a member of the judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence. These requirements stem from the need to ensure the strength and sustainability of the judiciary. “Integrity” is closely related to an applicant’s good reputation for honesty, incorruptibility, irreproachable conduct, and fidelity to sound moral and ethical standards. The Court has always viewed integrity with a goal of preserving the confidence of the litigants in the judiciary. B. YES. Compliance with the constitutional and statutory requirement of filing of SALN intimately relates to a person’s integrity. S17, Art. XI reads: Section 17. A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office and as often .thereafter as may be required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities, and net worth. In the case of the President, the Vice-President, the of the Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional offices, and officers of the armed forces with general or flag rank, the declaration shall be disclosed to the public in the manner provided by law. Even prior to the 1987 Constitution and as early as 1960, RA 3019 required from every public officer a SALN. RA 6713 expanded the obligation to disclose by enumerating the info required to be disclosed. The filing of SALN is so important for purposes of transparency and ability that failure to comply with such requirement may result in not only dismissal from public service but also in criminal liability. S11 of RA 6713 provides that non-compliance with the SALN requirement is not only punishable by imprisonment or fine, it may also result in disqualification to hold public office. Rule 5.08 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that “A judge shall make full financial disclosure as required by law.” Failure to file SALN is clearly a violation of the law. Sereno claims that failure to file SALN, without more, would not automatically negate integrity without any allegation or evidence that one committed graft and corruption by acquiring unexplained wealth. But this does not persuade. RA 6713 and 3019, being special laws, are malum prohibitum and not malum in se. it is the omission or commission of that act as defined by law and not the character or effect thereof that determines whether the provision has been violated. Whether Sereno accumulated unexplained wealth is not in issue, but whether she in the first place complied with the mandatory requirement of filing of SALNs. Sereno chronically failed to file her SALNs and thus violated the constitution, the law, and the Code of Judicial Conduct. A member of the judiciary who commits such violations canont be deemed to be a person of proven integrity. She could have dispelled doubts as to the filing or nonfiling of the SALNs by presenting them before the Court. Yet, she opted to withhold such evidence, if at all, for no clear reason. Other than offering legal or technical justifications, Sereno has not endeavored to convice this Court of the existence of the uned SALNs.
Sereno invokes the “Doblada doctrine,” (Concerned Taxpayer v. Doblada, Jr.) maintaining to have filed all her SALNs. She urges the Court to apply the doctrine and deem as sufficient her statement that she maintains that she consistently filed her SALNs. Sereno argues that in Doblada, the SC gave no evidentiary value to the OCA report stating that a branch sheriff failed to file his SALN for 18 years based only on contrary evidence of the sheriff that proves the existence of only one of his missing SALNs. The Court’s rationale in Doblada that one cannot readily conclude that respondent failed to file his SALN simply because these are missing in the OCA’s files should also be applicable to her case. Thus, Republic must prove that Sereno did not file her SALNs for all relevant years and not just that the same are no longer on file with the relevant offices. But there are checkered differences in Doblada and this case. The SC imposed the penalty of dismissal with forfeiture of benefits against Doblada for his failure to declare a true and detailed SALN for the years 1974, 1976, 1989, 1991, 1993, 1995, and 1998. The pronouncement as to nonfiling of SALNs for several years was not the basis for the imposition of penalty. The OCA reported that Doblada’s records show that he had not submitted his SALNs for 1975, 1977-1988, 1990, 1992, 1999, and 2000. Doblada explained having filed all his SALNs and its that he does not have copies of said SALNs as he might have accidentally disposed of them when he transferred offices. As proof, Doblada submitted a copy of a letter dated May 7, 2001 sent by the acting branch clerk of court saying that attached to the letter are the SALN of the staff of RTC Pasig branch 155 including Doblada’s for the year 2000. Said letter was established to have been sent and duly received by OCA, yet Doblada’s SALN for 2000 was one of those missing in OCA’s files. Thus, the OCA report was rendered inaccurate. Considering the contrary proof presented by Doblada in the form of the letter that the SALN for 2000 exists and was duly transmitted and received by OCA as repository agency, the Court inferred that Doblada filed his SALNs. Here, while UP-HRDO produced Sereno’s SALNs for 1985, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, and 2002, these SALNs are neither proven to be in the records of, nor was proven to have been sent to and duly received by ombudsman as the repository agency. Nonetheless, for the SALNs which UP-HRDO itself cannot produce, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1992, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006, and not proven to be in the records of, nor proven to have been sent to and received by ombudsman, are altogether a different matter. The existence of these SALNs and the fact of filing thereof were neither established by direct proof nor by inference. Also, OCA, as repository agency of Doblada, only said that it does not have on its file the subject SALN of Doblada. In contrast, the ombudsman, as repository agency, certified in Sereno’s case that there is no SALN filed by Sereno for 1999-2009 except SALN ending December 1998. Thus, Sereno did not file her SALNs, or filed only 11 out of her 20 years in UP. Thus, Republic was able to discharge its burden of proof and it becomes incumbent upon Sereno to discharge her burden of evidence. In civil cases, burden of proof rests upon plaintiff who is required to establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. Once this is done, the burden of evidence shifts to defendant who, in turn, has the burden to establish his defense. Also, the burden of proof in quo warranto is different when it is filed by the State. When respondent is called upon at the suit of the state to show by what warrant he assumes to exercise the functions of a public
office, the burden of proving his title rests upon respondent. Only when respondent has made out a prima facie right to the office that the burden of evidence shifts to the state. C. NO. Sereno’s inclusion in the matrix of candidates with complete requirements and in the shortlist nominated by JBC does not ratify her compliance with the SALN requirement. The invalidity of Sereno’s appointment springs from her lack of qualifications. Her inclusion in the shortlist does not negate nor supply her with the requisite proof of integrity. She should have been disqualified at the outset. Her letter of July 23, 2012 was not deliberated by JBC en banc. Thus, JBC en banc cannot be deemed to have considered her eligible because the failure to submit her SALNs was not squarely addressed by the body. Her nomination in the shortlist and subsequent appointment do not estop the Republic or the SC from looking into her qualifications. It appears that her inclusion was made under the erroneous belief that she complied with all the legal requirements. Sereno’s failure to submit to JBC her SALNs for several years means that her integrity was not established at the time of her application. -
Thus, Sereno is a de facto officer removable thru quo warranto. The effect of a finding that a person appointed to office is ineligible is that his presumably valid appointment will give him the color of title that confers on him the status of a de facto officer. A de facto judge is one who exercises the duties of a judicial office under color of an appointment or election thereto. He differs from a mere usurper who undertakes to act officially without any color of right and from a judge de jure who is in all respects legally appointed and qualified. For lack of a constitutional qualification, Sereno is ineligible to hold the CJ position and is merely holding a colorable right or title thereto. Thus, she never attained the status of an impeachable official.
On June 25, 2012, JBC enbanc resolved not to require incumbent SC justices who are candidates for CJ to submit other documentary requirements. Instead, it required them to submit only the SALNs, bank waiver, med cert, lab results, and PDS. On July 2, 2012, Sereno accepted several nominations from the legal and evangelical community for CJ and submitted to ORSN her SALNs for 2009, 2010, and 2011. On July 20, 2012, the JBC in its en banc meeting deliberated on the candidates with incomplete documentary requirements. Their deliberation reveal: 10. Justice Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno The Executive Officer informed the Council that she had not submitted her SALNs for a period of ten (10) years, that is, from 1986 to 2006. Senator Escudero mentioned that Justice Sereno was his professor at U.P. and that they were required to submit SALNs during those years. Because there were several candidates with incomplete documentary requirements, JBC en banc agreed to extend the deadline for submission of lacking requirements to July 23, 2012 and those who fail to complete the requirements are to be excluded. On July 20, the ORSN, thru its then Chief Atty. Pascual, inquired as to Sereno’s SALNs for 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1999(*acc to Sereno), although Atty. Pascual testified in the congressional hearing for Sereno’s impeachment that he had asked for 1995-2006. In response, Sereno sent a letter of even date, saying that most of her government records in the academe are more than 15 years old and thus it is infeasible to retrieve those files. The UP had cleared her already of academic/istrative responsibilities and thus considered her SALN requirements to have been met. She says that since she had a break in government service from 2006 until her appointment as justice on 2010, and that since she had been cleard, she reqests that the requirements she needs to comply with be viewed as that from a private sector before her appointment to the government again in 2010. But the letter was neither examined by JBC nor deliberated upon by JBC enbanc or the Execom. They could not produce any minutes of the meeting that the JBC deliberated on the letter. On the scheduled date of interview on July 24, despite Sereno’s submission of only 3 SALNs, Atty. Pascual prepared a report where Sereno was listed as applicant No. 14 with an annotation that she had “COMPLETE REQUIREMENTS” and a note stating “Letter 7/23/12- considering that her government records in the academe are more than 15 yo, it is reasonable to consider it infeasible to retrieve all those files.” On August 6, 2012, ORSN prepared a list of the 20 candidates, Sereno included, vis-à-vis their SALN submissions. Opposite her name was an enumeration of the SALNs she submitted- 2009, 2010, and 2011, and the same excerpt from her July 23, 2012 letter. On Aug. 13, 2012, JBC voted on who to include in the shortlist and on the same day transmitted to the president its nominations for CJ. Included therein was Sereno. On August 24, 2012, Sereno was appointed by President Noynoy. On August 30, 2017 5 yrs later, an impeachment complaint was filed by Atty. Larry Gadon against Sereno with the Committee on Justice (COJ) of HoR for culpable violation of the constitution etc. and for failing to make truthful declarations in her SALNs. This was endorsed by several
of the HoR and was found sufficient in form and substance. The COJ held several hearings to determine probable cause. During these hearings, it was revealed that Sereno purportedly failed to file her SALNs while she was a member of UP-COL and that she filed her SALN only for 1998, 2002, and 2006. Justice Peralta, as resource person being then the ex-officio chairman of JBC, claimed that during the JBC deliberations in 2012, he was not made aware that Sereno submitted incomplete SALNs nor that Sereno’s letter of July 23, 2012 to JBC was ever deliberated upon. This was confirmed by Atty. Cayosa and Atty. Capacite, who emphasized that based on the rubber stamp received, only the offices of the JBC regular , ORSN, and OEO were furnished copies on the letter and by Atty. Pascual. This spawned two incidents: 1) proposal of COJ for the SC to investigate on the JBC proceedings on the nomination of Sereno as CJ, and 2) letter dated Feb. 21, 2018 of Atty. Mallari to OSG requesting that the latter, in representation of the Republic, initiate a quo warranto against Sereno. Hence this petition. OSG files this case for quo warranto against the incumbent CJ Sereno, to declare her ineligible to hold CJ for failing to regularly disclose her SALN as a member of the career service prior to her appointment as justice, and later as CJ, in violation of the constitution, anti-graft Law, and the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. OSG claims that quo warranto is the proper remedy to question the validity of Sereno’s appointment. He claims that quo warranto is available as a remedy even as against impeachable officers like Sereno. He claims that Sereno failed to show that she is a person of proven integrity which is an indispensable qualification for hip in the Judiciary under S7(3), Art. VIII. Sereno claims thato n the strength of S2, Art. XI, and Mayor Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, Cuenco v. Hon. Fernan, In Re: First Indorsement from Hon. Gonzales, and Re: Complaint-Affidavit for Disbarment Against Senior Associate Justice Antonio Carpio, the CJ may be ousted from office only by impeachment. “May be removed from office” in S2, Art. XI does not signify that of SC may be removed thru modes other than impeachment. The clear intent of the framers was to create an exclusive category of public officers who can be removed only by impeachment. She claims that she was not required to file her SALN during the time she was on official leave without pay. She continues to recover her missing SALNs and will present them before the Senate sitting as Impeachment Tribunal and not to SC considering her objections to SC’s jurisdiction. The question of whether an applicant for CJ is a person of “proven integrity” is a question constitutionally committed to JBC and is a political question. OSG cites Estrada v. Desierto and Lawyer’s League for a Better PH and Oliber Lozano v. Pres. Corazon Aquino where the SC took cognizance of a petition for quo warranto to oust an impeachable official. OSG argues that Concerned Taxpayer v. Doblada Jr. is not on all fours with this petition as it did not involve issues on qualifications to public office unlike this petition. Motions for Inhibition Sereno seeks the inhibition of 5 justices of the SC- Bersamin, Peralta, Jardeleza, Tijam, and Leonardo-De Castro. She imputes actual bias on said justices for having testified before COJ on
the impeachment complaint. Peralta’s inhibition is sought as he, being then acting ex officio chair of JBC, would have personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts and for having served as a material witness in the controversy. Tijam’s inhibition is based on his statement in a Manila Times article to the effect that if Sereno continues to ignore the impeachment process, she is clearly liable for culpable violation of the constitution. Tijam and Bersamin also wore a touch of red during the “Red Monday” protest on March 12, 2018 where judges and court employees reportedly called on Sereno to resign. De Castro is claimed to have prejudged the issue when she testified in COJ that Sereno should have been disqualified from the shortlist on of the SALNs she allegedly failed to submit. At the last minute, she seeks to disqualify Justice Martires for his purpoted insinuations during the Oral Arguments questioning Sereno’s mental fitness on the basis of her belief that God is the “source of everything in (her) life.” ISSUES: 1. Whether SC can assume jurisdiction and give due course to this petition for quo warranto against Sereno who is an impeachable officer and against whom an impeachment complaint has already been filed with HoR. 2. Whether the petition is outrightly dismissible on the ground of prescription. 3. Whether Sereno is eligible for the position of CJ a. Whether the determination of a candidate’s eligibility for nomination is the exclusive function of JBC and whether such determination is a political question outside the SC’s review powers. b. Whether Sereno failed to file her SALNs as mandated by the constitution and law, and if so whether the failure voids the nomination and appointment of Sereno as CJ. c. In case Sereno is inegligible to hold the position of CJ, whether her subsequent nomination by JBC and the appointment by the President cured such ineligibility. HELD: - NO basis for the associate justices of SC to inhibit This petition comes at the heels of the recently-concluded hearings on the determination of probable cause in the impeachment complaint against Sereno before COJ. Several of SC, both incumbent and retired, were invited, under pain of contempt, to serve as resource persons. Those who were present at the COJ hearings were armed with the requisite imprimatur of SC en banc, given that are to testify only on matters within their personal knowledge and insofar as material to the issues being heard. Sereno cites “Appear in Congress or violate Constitution” dated Dec 4, 2017, where Justice Tijam was purportedly quoted to have said that if Sereno continues to ignore the impeachment process, she is liable for culpable violation of the constitution. As for the other justices, the cause for inhibition ultimately simmers to the question of whether, in appearing and testifying before COJ, the justices are precluded from hearing and deciding this quo warranto petition. The Court answers in the negative. The right of a party to seek the inhibition or disqualification of a judge who does not appear to be wholly, free, disinterested etc. in handling the case must be balanced with the judge’s duty to
decide cases without fear of repression. The movant must thus prove the ground of bias and prejudice by clear and convincing evidence to disqualify a judge. A circumspect reading of Tijam’s statements in the Manila Times article reveals that the manifest intent of the statements was only to prod Sereno to observe and respect the constitutional process of impeachment and to exemplify the ideals of public ability. Sereno conveniently invoked only a portion of the article which suited her objective of imputing bias against justice Tijam. As to the wearing of red tie which purportedly establishes Tijam and Bersamin’s prejudice against her, there is no basis in law or in logic to establish a connection between a piece of clothing and a magistrate’s performance of adjudicatory functions. Absent compelling proof to the contrary, the red piece of clothing was merely coincidental. Rule 137, S1 does not give judges unfettered discretion to decide whether to desist from hearing a case. The inhibition must be for just and valid causes. Mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground for inhibition especially when the charge is without basis. As to voluntary inhibition, the mere fact that some justices participated in the COJ heariings does not make them disqualified. Their appearance thereat was in deference to HoR whose constitutional duty to investigate the impeachment complaint against Sereno could not be doubted. The SC en banc consented to the appearance. In fact, Justice Tijam, in his sworn statement to COJ, identified the purpose of his attendance as not to be a witness for complainant, but to accord due respect to the constitutionally established process of impeachment. The justices refused to answer the question as to whether Sereno’s acts were impeachable offenses as it was not theirs to decide but a function belonging to the Senate. A judge may decide, in the exercise of his sound discretion, to recuse himself from a case for just or valid reasons. Sereno’s call for inhibition has been based on speculations or on distortions of the language, context, and meaning of the answers the justices gave as witnesses in the COJ hearings. Justice Bersamin’s statement that “Ang SC ay hindi po maaring mag function kung isa ay diktador” is clearly a hypothetical statement. Justice Peralta’s statement in the hearing that had he been informed of the July 23, 2012 letter of Sereno, he would have immediately objected to the selection of the CJ for voting because it was a very clear deviation from existing rules is clearly a hypothetical statement. It was expressed in line with his functions as then acting chair of JBC. At the time, this petition had not yet been filed. Thus, such statement cannot amount to prejudgment of the case. Also, according to Peralta, he had no personal knowledge of the disputed facts concerning the proceedings, specifically the matters considered by the JBC in preparing the shortlist of nominees as it was the ORSN which was tasked to determine the completeness of the applicants’ documentary requirements. Justice Martires has not suggested that Sereno suffers from some mental illness. At most, his questions during the oral arguments of this case were merely hypothetical in nature. To impute actual bias based on such a brief discourse with respect to hypothetical matters is highly speculative.
In Jurado & Co. v. Hongkong Bank, the SC elucidated that a challenge to the competency of a judge may it of two constructions: 1) the magistrate decides for himself the question of his competency and his decision therein is conclusive and the other of the Court have no voice in it, 2) the challenged magistrate sits with the Court and decides the challenge as a collegial body. The SC adopted the second view. The Court sees no reason to deviate from its standing practice of resolving competency challenges as a collegial body without excluding the challenged member from participating therein. Thus, the SC denies Sereno’s motion to inhibit and Sereno’s urging that the justices deliberate and decide the matter of inhibition of the justices without the justices themselves participating in the deliberation. 1. YES. S5, Art. VIII provides that SC shall exercise original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. This Court, the CA, and RTC have concurrent jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writs including quo warranto. S7, Rule 66 provides that the venue of an action for quo warranto when commenced by solgen is either the RTC in Manila, in CA, or in SC. While the hierarchy of courts serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs, a direct invocation of SC’s original jurisdiction is allowed when there are special and important reasons therefor. Here, direct resort to SC is justified considering that the petition questions the qualification of no less than a member of SC. This petition is a case of transcendental importance and of first impression. The qualification of an incumbent CJ are being scrutinized. Sereno argues that she is an impeachable officer. Thus, quo warranto cannot be lodged against her especially when there is an impending impeachment case against her. This argument is misplaced. While both may result in the ouster of a public official, the origin, nature, and purpose of impeachment and quo warranto are materially different. Impeachment is political in nature, while quo warranto is judicial. Impeachment is a proceeding exercised by the legislative as representatives of the sovereign to vindicate the breach of trust of the people. Quo warranto involves a judicial determination of the eligibility or validity of the election or appointment of a public official based on predetermined rules. In PH, the earliest record of impeachment in our laws is the 1935 constitution. As currently worded, the 1987 Constitution added a ground as compared to the 1935, “betrayal of public trust.” Commisioner de los Reyes of the concom explained that this ground is a “catch-all phrase to include all acts which are not punishable by statutes as penal offenses, but nonetheless render the officer unfit to continue in office. it includes betrayal of public interest, inexcusable negligence of duty, abuse of power, cronyism, etc.” It is essentially a political process meant to vindicate the violation of the public’s trust. As to quo warranto, in PH, the remedies against usurpers of public office appeared in the 1900s thru Act 190. S197 of this Act provides for a provision comparable to S1, Rule 66 of RoC.
-Quo warranto and impeachment can PROCEED INDEPENDENTLY and SIMULTANEOUSLY of each other as these remedies are distinct as to 1) jurisdiction, 2) grounds, 3) applicable rules of initiation, filing, and dismissal, and 4) limitations. “Quo Warranto” is Latin for “by what authority.” Thus, it is a writ of inquiry. It determines whether an individual has the legal right to hold the public office he or she occupies. A quo warranto proceeding is an action by the government against individuals unlawfully holding an office. S1, Rule 66 reads: 1. Action by Government against individuals. -An action for the usurpation of a public office, position or franchise may be commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines against: (a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, position or franchise; (b) A public officer who does or suffers an act which, by the provision of law, constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of his office; or (c) An association which acts as a corporation within the Philippines without being legally incorporated or without lawful authority so to act. This remedy is vested in the people and not in any private individual or group, because disputes over title to public office are viewed as a public question of governmental legitimacy and not merely a private quarrel. The only time that an individual, in his own name, may bring an action for quo warranto is when he has a claim over the position in question (S5, Rule 66). Solgen, in the exercise of sound discretion, may turn down the institution of an action for quo warranto where there are valid reasons. Upon receipt of a case certified to him, he may prosecute the case or not. Quo warranto is proper to determine the right or title to the contested public office or to oust the holder from its enjoyment. In quo warranto as to offices filled by election, what is determined is the eligibility of the candidates elected while in quo warranto as to offices filled by appointment, what is determined is the LEGALITY OF THE APPOINTMENT. The title to a public office may not be contested collaterally but only directly by quo warranto. This precludes the filing of a prohibition petition to inquire into the validity of appointment of a public officer. In case of usurpation of public office when respondent is found guilty of usurping, intruding into, or unlawfully holding public office, the judgment shall include: 1) the respondent shall be ousted and excluded from the office, 2) the petitioner shall recover his costs, and 3) such further judgment determining the respective rights in and to the public office of all parties to the action. This does not include reversal of acts taken under the ostensible authority of an office. Is there forum shopping because there is already the impeachment case? The test for determining the existence of forum shopping is whether in the two or more cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights or causes of action, and reliefs sought. There is litis pendentia when there is: 1) identity of parties or at least such parties as those representing the same interests in both actions, 2) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, and 3) identity as to the two cases such that any judgment in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case.
There is res judicata or prior judgment barring a subsequent case when 1) the former judgment is final, 2) it is rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties, 3) it is a judgment or order on the merits, and 4) there is, between the two actions, identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action. Here, the causes of action are different. In quo warranto, the cause of action lies on the usurping of public office while in impeachment, it is the commission of an impeachable offense. The crux of this controversy is whether Sereno legally holds the CJ position to be considered as an impeachable officer in the first place. She is not being prosecuted here for impeachable offenses in the Articles of impeachment in HoR. While Sereno’s title to hold public office is the issue in quo warranto, impeachment necessarily presupposes that she legally holds the public office and is thus an impeachable officer. The reliefs sought are also different. In quo warranto, respondent shall be adjudged to cease from holding a public office which he is ineligible to hold. In impeachment, a conviction of impeachable offenses shall result to the removal of respondent from public office that he is legally holding. Since the complaint was referred to COJ, there is an impeachment “proceeding”, but no impeachment “case” yet. The COJ’s determination of probable cause is akin to the prosecutor’s determination during preliminary investigation. The prosecutor does not determine the guilt or innocence of accused. Thus, during preliminary investigation before the prosecutor, there is no pending case to speak of yet. Thus, there is no pending impeachment “case” that would bar the quo warranto on the ground of forum shopping. -
Impeachment is NOT an EXCLUSIVE remedy by which an INVALIDLY APPOINTED or elected IMPEACHABLE official may be removed from office. Sereno claims that she can only be removed by impeach, citing Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, Cuenco v. Fernan, In Re Gonzales, Jarque v. Desierto, and Marcoleta v. Borra. But none of these cases concerned the validity of an impeachable officer’s appointment. Whether the impeachable officer unlawfully held his office was not in issue. The principle laid down in said cases is that during their incumbency, impeachable officers cannot be criminally prosecuted for an offense that carries with it the penalty of removal, and if they are required to be of PH Bar to qualify, they cannot be charged with disbarment. The proscription does not extend to actions assailing the public officer’s title to the office he occupies. In issuing such pronouncement, the SC is presumed to be aware of its power to issue writs of quo warranto under Rule 66 of RoC. Even the PET rules provide for the remedy of either an election protest or quo warranto to question the eligibility of the president and VP, both of whom are impeachable officers. To follow Sereno’s theory that impeachable officials can be removed only thru impeachment means that a president or VP against whom an election protest has been filed can demand for dismissal thereof on the ground that it can potentially cause his removal from office thru a mode other than impeachment. This would render election protests nugatory. In fact, in Estrada v. Desierto and Estrada v. Macapagal-Arroyo, the SC took cognizance over the quo warranto filed against respondent who had taken an oath and assumed the presidency. By
entertaining the quo warranto petition, the SC determined whether president Estrada has put an end to his official status by his alleged act of resignation. -
Also, the language of S2, Art. XI does not foreclose quo warranto against impeachable officers: Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the of the Supreme Court, the of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment. If the language under consideration is plain, it is neither necessary to resort to extrinsic aids, like the records of the constitutional convention, for its interpretation. The provision uses the permissive “may” which, in STATCON, denotes discretion. “May” is indicative of a mere possibility, an opportunity, or an option. Thus, by its tenor, S2, Art. XI allows the institution of quo warranto against an impeachable officer. To subscribe to the view that appointments or election of impeachable officers are outside judicial review is to cleanse their appointments or election of any possible defect pertaining to constitutionally-prescribed qualifications which cannot otherwise be raised in an impeachment proceeding. The courts should be able to inquire into the validity of appointments even of impeachable officers. Otherwise, an absurd situation is allowed where such appointment cannot be questioned even when, for instance, the officer is of foreign nationality or, where bar hip is a qualification for an office, he fraudulently represented himself to be a bar member. Unless the officer commits any of the grounds for impeachment, he can continue discharging the functions of his office. -
The SC’s exercise of its jurisdiction over quo warranto is not violative of separation of powers. S3(1) and S3(6), Art. XI respectively provides that HoR shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment while the Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. Nonetheless, an action for quo warranto tests the right of a person to occupy a public position. While impeachment concerns actions that make the officer unfit to continue exercising his office, quo warranto involves matters that render him ineligible to hold the position to begin with. Given its nature and effect, quo warranto is unavailing to determine whether an official has committed misconduct in office nor is it proper to evaluate the person’s performance in office. Quo warranto does not try a person’s culpability of an impeachment offense. The role of the courts thru quo warranto complements separation of powers. The Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over quo warranto does not preclude Congress from enforcing its own prerogative of determining probable cause for impeachment, to transmit the Articles of Impeachment, nor will it preclude the Senate from exercising its power of impeachment. The Senate, as impeachment tribunal, cannot be expected to rule on the validity of the CJ’s appointment as this would disturb checks and balances and dilute judicial power of courts upon which jurisdiction is exclusively vested to rule on actions for quo warranto. Its ruling thereon would not
be with jurisprudential binding effect because rulings of the impeachment court, being a political rather than judicial body, do not form part of the laws of the land. The Court demarcates that an act or omission committed PRIOR to or AT THE TIME of appointment or election relating to an official’s qualifications to hold office as to render such appointment/election invalid is properly subject of quo warranto. Contrariwise, acts or omissions, even if it relates to the qualification of integrity, being a continuing requirement but nonetheless committed DURING the incumbency of a VALIDLY appointed/elected official CANNOT be the subject of quo warranto, but of something else, either impeachment, if impeachable, or disciplinary, istrative or criminal action, if otherwise. An outright dismissal of the petition based on speculation that Sereno will eventually be tried on impeachment is a clear abdication of the Court’s duty to settle actual controversy squarely presented before it. 2. NO. Prescription does not lie against the State. The rules on quo warranto, S11, Rule 66, read: Limitations. -Nothing contained in this Rule shall be construed to authorize an action against a public officer or employee for his ouster from office unless the same be commenced within one (1) year after the cause of such ouster, or the right of the petitioner to hold such office or position, arose; nor to authorize an action for damages in accordance with the provisions of the next preceding section unless the same be commenced within one (1) year after the entry of the judgment establishing the petitioner's right to the office in question. It was held that the 1-year period is a condition precedent to the existence of the cause of action for quo warranto and inaction of an officer for 1 year could be considered a waiver of his right to file the same. The reason for setting a prescriptive period is the urgency of the matter to be resolved. The government must be immediately informed if any person claims to be entitled to an office in the civil service as against another holding it so that the government may not be faced with the predicament of having to pay two salaries. But the petitioners in these past cases were private individuals asserting their right of office, unlike here where the government itself commenced the quo warranto. Thus, the one year limitation is NOT EQUALLY APPLICABLE when the petitioner is not a mere private individual, but the GOVERNMENT itself. S2 of Rule 66 reads: SEC. 2. When Solicitor General or public prosecutor must commence action. -The Solicitor General or a public prosecutor, when directed by the President of the Philippines, or when upon complaint or otherwise he has good reason to believe that any case specified in the preceding section can be established by proof must commence such action. This makes it compulsory for solgen to commence a quo warranto. A quo warranto action is a governmental function and not a proprietary function. Thus, no statute of limitations is applicable. The basic principle that “prescription does not lie against the State” which finds textual basis under Art. 1108 (4) of NCC applies in this case.
Since the remedy of quo warranto is intended to prevent a continuing exercise of an authority unlawfully asserted, no statute of limitation applies to the action. No prudent or just court would allow an unqualified person to hold public office. The Republic cannot be faulted for questioning Sereno’s qualification for office only upon discovery of the cause of ouster. Sereno was never forthright as to whether or not she filed her SALNs covering the period of her employment in UP. Recall that in response to the JBC requiring her submission of previous SALNs, Sereno never categorically said that she filed them. Instead, she cleverly hid the fact of non-filing by stating that she should not be required to submit the documents as she was considered to be coming from private practice and that it was not feasible to retrieve most of her records in the academe as they were more than 15 yo. Even up to now, Sereno has not been candid on whether she filed the required SALNs or not. The defect on Sereno’s appointment was not discernible but was deliberately rendered obscure. Thus, there can be no acquiescence or inaction on the part of Republic as would amount to an abandonment of its right to seek redress against a public wrong. 3. NO. A. NO. The SC exercises supervisory authority over JBC. This authority includes ensuring that JBC complies with its own rules. S8(1), Art. VIII reads: A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court, composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio , a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law" a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector. The power of supervision means “overseeing or the authority of an officer to see to it that the subordinate officers perform their duties.” The supervisor merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he does not lay down the rules. Essentially, the power means no more than the power of ensuring that laws are faithfully executed, or that subordinate officers act within the law. The SC’s supervisory power consists of seeing to it that JBC complies with its own rules and procedures. The JBC’s duty to recommend or nominate, although calling for discretion, is neither absolute nor unlimited. In carrying out its main function, JBC has the authority to set the standards/criteria in choosing its nominees for every vacancy in the judiciary, subject only to the minimum qualifications required by the Constitution and law for every position. While the resolution of who to nominate as between two candidates of equal qualification cannot be dictated by SC upon JBC, such surrender of choice presupposes that whosoever is nominated is not otherwise disqualified. Thus, the nomination by JBC is not an exercise of policy or wisdom as to place JBC’s actions in the same category as political questions. Questions of policy or wisdom refer to those questions which, under the constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of government. Thus, the SC has authority, as an incident of its power of supervision over JBC, to insure that JBC faithfully executes its duties as the constitution requires of it. SC has power to inquire into the process leading to Sereno’s nomination for CJ.
- Qualifications under the constitution cannot be waived or bargained away by JBC. JBC’s discretion is limited by the constitution when it prescribed qualifications. In S7, Art. VIII, among the qualifications are: (3) A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence. More than age, citizenship, and professional qualifications, the constitution is clear that a member of the judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence. These requirements stem from the need to ensure the strength and sustainability of the judiciary. “Integrity” is closely related to an applicant’s good reputation for honesty, incorruptibility, irreproachable conduct, and fidelity to sound moral and ethical standards. The Court has always viewed integrity with a goal of preserving the confidence of the litigants in the judiciary. B. YES. Compliance with the constitutional and statutory requirement of filing of SALN intimately relates to a person’s integrity. S17, Art. XI reads: Section 17. A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office and as often .thereafter as may be required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities, and net worth. In the case of the President, the Vice-President, the of the Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional offices, and officers of the armed forces with general or flag rank, the declaration shall be disclosed to the public in the manner provided by law. Even prior to the 1987 Constitution and as early as 1960, RA 3019 required from every public officer a SALN. RA 6713 expanded the obligation to disclose by enumerating the info required to be disclosed. The filing of SALN is so important for purposes of transparency and ability that failure to comply with such requirement may result in not only dismissal from public service but also in criminal liability. S11 of RA 6713 provides that non-compliance with the SALN requirement is not only punishable by imprisonment or fine, it may also result in disqualification to hold public office. Rule 5.08 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that “A judge shall make full financial disclosure as required by law.” Failure to file SALN is clearly a violation of the law. Sereno claims that failure to file SALN, without more, would not automatically negate integrity without any allegation or evidence that one committed graft and corruption by acquiring unexplained wealth. But this does not persuade. RA 6713 and 3019, being special laws, are malum prohibitum and not malum in se. it is the omission or commission of that act as defined by law and not the character or effect thereof that determines whether the provision has been violated. Whether Sereno accumulated unexplained wealth is not in issue, but whether she in the first place complied with the mandatory requirement of filing of SALNs. Sereno chronically failed to file her SALNs and thus violated the constitution, the law, and the Code of Judicial Conduct. A member of the judiciary who commits such violations canont be deemed to be a person of proven integrity. She could have dispelled doubts as to the filing or nonfiling of the SALNs by presenting them before the Court. Yet, she opted to withhold such evidence, if at all, for no clear reason. Other than offering legal or technical justifications, Sereno has not endeavored to convice this Court of the existence of the uned SALNs.
Sereno invokes the “Doblada doctrine,” (Concerned Taxpayer v. Doblada, Jr.) maintaining to have filed all her SALNs. She urges the Court to apply the doctrine and deem as sufficient her statement that she maintains that she consistently filed her SALNs. Sereno argues that in Doblada, the SC gave no evidentiary value to the OCA report stating that a branch sheriff failed to file his SALN for 18 years based only on contrary evidence of the sheriff that proves the existence of only one of his missing SALNs. The Court’s rationale in Doblada that one cannot readily conclude that respondent failed to file his SALN simply because these are missing in the OCA’s files should also be applicable to her case. Thus, Republic must prove that Sereno did not file her SALNs for all relevant years and not just that the same are no longer on file with the relevant offices. But there are checkered differences in Doblada and this case. The SC imposed the penalty of dismissal with forfeiture of benefits against Doblada for his failure to declare a true and detailed SALN for the years 1974, 1976, 1989, 1991, 1993, 1995, and 1998. The pronouncement as to nonfiling of SALNs for several years was not the basis for the imposition of penalty. The OCA reported that Doblada’s records show that he had not submitted his SALNs for 1975, 1977-1988, 1990, 1992, 1999, and 2000. Doblada explained having filed all his SALNs and its that he does not have copies of said SALNs as he might have accidentally disposed of them when he transferred offices. As proof, Doblada submitted a copy of a letter dated May 7, 2001 sent by the acting branch clerk of court saying that attached to the letter are the SALN of the staff of RTC Pasig branch 155 including Doblada’s for the year 2000. Said letter was established to have been sent and duly received by OCA, yet Doblada’s SALN for 2000 was one of those missing in OCA’s files. Thus, the OCA report was rendered inaccurate. Considering the contrary proof presented by Doblada in the form of the letter that the SALN for 2000 exists and was duly transmitted and received by OCA as repository agency, the Court inferred that Doblada filed his SALNs. Here, while UP-HRDO produced Sereno’s SALNs for 1985, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, and 2002, these SALNs are neither proven to be in the records of, nor was proven to have been sent to and duly received by ombudsman as the repository agency. Nonetheless, for the SALNs which UP-HRDO itself cannot produce, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1992, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006, and not proven to be in the records of, nor proven to have been sent to and received by ombudsman, are altogether a different matter. The existence of these SALNs and the fact of filing thereof were neither established by direct proof nor by inference. Also, OCA, as repository agency of Doblada, only said that it does not have on its file the subject SALN of Doblada. In contrast, the ombudsman, as repository agency, certified in Sereno’s case that there is no SALN filed by Sereno for 1999-2009 except SALN ending December 1998. Thus, Sereno did not file her SALNs, or filed only 11 out of her 20 years in UP. Thus, Republic was able to discharge its burden of proof and it becomes incumbent upon Sereno to discharge her burden of evidence. In civil cases, burden of proof rests upon plaintiff who is required to establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. Once this is done, the burden of evidence shifts to defendant who, in turn, has the burden to establish his defense. Also, the burden of proof in quo warranto is different when it is filed by the State. When respondent is called upon at the suit of the state to show by what warrant he assumes to exercise the functions of a public
office, the burden of proving his title rests upon respondent. Only when respondent has made out a prima facie right to the office that the burden of evidence shifts to the state. C. NO. Sereno’s inclusion in the matrix of candidates with complete requirements and in the shortlist nominated by JBC does not ratify her compliance with the SALN requirement. The invalidity of Sereno’s appointment springs from her lack of qualifications. Her inclusion in the shortlist does not negate nor supply her with the requisite proof of integrity. She should have been disqualified at the outset. Her letter of July 23, 2012 was not deliberated by JBC en banc. Thus, JBC en banc cannot be deemed to have considered her eligible because the failure to submit her SALNs was not squarely addressed by the body. Her nomination in the shortlist and subsequent appointment do not estop the Republic or the SC from looking into her qualifications. It appears that her inclusion was made under the erroneous belief that she complied with all the legal requirements. Sereno’s failure to submit to JBC her SALNs for several years means that her integrity was not established at the time of her application. -
Thus, Sereno is a de facto officer removable thru quo warranto. The effect of a finding that a person appointed to office is ineligible is that his presumably valid appointment will give him the color of title that confers on him the status of a de facto officer. A de facto judge is one who exercises the duties of a judicial office under color of an appointment or election thereto. He differs from a mere usurper who undertakes to act officially without any color of right and from a judge de jure who is in all respects legally appointed and qualified. For lack of a constitutional qualification, Sereno is ineligible to hold the CJ position and is merely holding a colorable right or title thereto. Thus, she never attained the status of an impeachable official.
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