Land Titles Case Digest 1h3962

1. ISLAMIC DIRECTORATE VS CA 272 SCRA 254 2. FRANK N. LIU VS LOY 438 SCRA 244 3. SPS ANTONIO VERA CRUZ VS CALDERON JULY 14, 2004 4. SPS DIMACULANGAN VS ROMASANTA FEB 27, 2004 5. ALINAS VS ALINAS APRIL 14, 2008 6. EAGLE REALTY VS REPUBLIC JULY 4, 2008 7. ALEJANDRO TY VS QUEEN ROW DECEMBER 4, 2009 8. GREGORIO TENGCO VS. HEIRS OF JOSE ALIVALAS, 168 SCRA 198 9. REPUBLIC VS. HEIRS OF CARLE, 105 PHIL. 1227 (1959); 10. INGARAN VS RAMELO, 107 PHIL. 498 (1960); 11. LOPEZ VS. PADILLA, G.R. 27559, MAY 18, 1972, 45 SCRA 44 12. APUYAN VS HALDEMAN 438 SCRA 402 13. VDA. DE CABRERA VS CA (267 SCRA 339) 15. HEIRS OF MALABANAN VS REPUBLIC, APRIL 29, 2009 16. GUNDOLA V. CA 284 SCRA 617 17. REPUBLIC V. CA 235 SCRA 567 18. DFA V. CA NOV 20 2000 19. PAGKATIPUNAN V. CA MARCH 21 2002 20. REPUBLIC V. DE GUZMAN 326 SCRA574 21. REPUBLIC VS CA AND NAGUIT 23. TOMAS AVERIA, JR., V THE HONORABLE MILAGROS V. CAGUIOA 24. ASSOCIATION OF BAPTISTS FOR WORLD EVANGELISM, INC VS FIRST BAPTIST CHURCH AN D COURT OF APPEALS 25. UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. SEGUNDINA ROSARIO 26. Director vs CA (April 30, 1991) 27. Republic vs de Guzman (326 SCRa 574) 28. Republic vs Herbieto (May 26, 2005) 29. . Buenaventura vs Republic (March 2, 2007) 30. Fieldman vs Republic (March 28, 2008) 31. Republic vs Imperial (June 25, 2008) 32. Republic vs Diloy (August 26, 2008) 33. Republic vs Bibonia (June 21, 2007) 34. Llanes vs Republic (November 27, 2008) 35. Republic vs Cayetano Serrano (Feb 24, 2010) 36 Director of Lands v. CA (106 SCRA 426) 37. REPUBLIC VS VDA DE NERI MARCH 4, 2004 ANGELITA F. BUENAVENTURA and PRECIOSA F. BUENAVENTURA vs .REPUBLIC Facts: Petitioners then filed an Application for Registration of Title on 5 June 2000 b efore the RTC of Parañaque City of the subject property, more particularly describ ed as Cadastral Lot No. 5001-B, Csd-007604-000176-D, located in San Dionisio, Pa rañaque City, Petitioners alleged that they and their predecessors-in-interest acquired title to the said parcel of land thru inheritance, transfer, and possession as owners of the same since time immemorial and/or within the period provided for by law. The court a quo issued an Order granting the application for registration of tit le of the subject property. However, the Republic appealed to the Court of Appea ls. According to the Republic, petitioners failed to prove continuous, open, exc lusive and notorious possession by their predecessors-in-interest and by themsel ves. The Republic further argues that petitioners own evidence tends to show that the subject property is not alienable and disposable because it was a salt bed and a fishpond and under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, except for agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. On 23 August 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision in favor of the Rep ublic, thus, overturning the Order of the court a quo, and the parcel of land su bject matter of the application is declared public land. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Decision, but it was denied for lack of merit. Hence, this Petition for Certiorari. Issue 1: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in nullifying the Decision of

the trial court confirming petitioners title over the subject property for not b eing allegedly ed by substantial evidence as required by law. YES. The Court found out that petitioners offered in evidence a certification20 from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, National Capital Regio n dated 29 October 2001, to prove that the subject property was alienable and di sposable land of the public domain. Said certification is sufficient to establis h the true nature or character of the subject property. The certification enjoys a presumption of regularity in the absence of contradictory evidence. Issue2: Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in declaring the subje ct property as pubic land and ignoring petitioners evidence of over 50 year posse ssion in the concept of an owner and completely unmolested by any adverse claim. YES. Even if the possession of alienable lands of the public domain commenced on ly after 12 June 1945, application for registration of the said property is stil l possible by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree which speaks of prescription. Hence, because of Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree N o. 1529, those who are in possession of alienable and disposable land, and whose possession has been characterized as open, continuous and exclusive for 30 year s or more, may have the right to their title to such land despite the f act that their possession of the land commenced only after 12 June 1945. In the present case, while petitioners possession over the subject property can b e reckoned only on 3 January 1968, the date when according to evidence, the subj ect property became alienable and disposable, they can still have the subject pr operty ed in their names by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property Regi stration Decree. WHEREFORE, the court granted petitioners application for registration of the subj ect property and directing the issuance of a decree of registration in petitione rs favor. REPUBLIC VS. HEIRS OF CARLE, 105 PHIL. FACTS: The homestead application filed by respondent Ciriaco Carle over a parcel of lan d located in Pola, Oriental Mindoro (H. A. No. 154223-E 72825) was approved on A ugust 30, 1930 and the applicant, having died in 1942, the Homestead Patent No. 71852 corresponding to said application was issued to his heirs on April 26, 194 4, which was then transmitted to and recorded by the of Deeds of said p rovince. On May 11, 1946, the certificate of title (O.C.T. No. 4648) was duly issued in f avor of Ciriaco Carle s heirs. Seven years later, upon the opposition of a certain Meynardo Ilagan to the issua nce of Patent No. 71582 to the heirs of Carle, the Director of Lands declared th e said patent inoperative as it converse a certain portion that is covered by th e homestead application of the oppositor and adjudged the same in the latter s fav our simply because the inclusion of the aforementioned area in the former s patent was erroneous. On appeal by the heirs, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources affir med the order of the Director of Lands; and on December 2, 1955, the Director of Lands filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Mindoro praying that Homestead Patent No. 71852 be declared null and void and prayed further that th e respondents be ordered to surrender the patent and the certificate of title is sued to the Director of Lands and the of Deeds of Mindoro, respectively , for cancellation. Respondent moved to dismiss the petition, claiming that as more than one year fr om the issuance of the certificate of title had already elapsed, petitioner's ca use of action was already barred by prescription; and considering the aforesaid motion and the opposition thereto filed by the petitioner, the Court a quo in it s order of March 2, 1957, dismissed the petition on the ground that said action was filed beyond the period of limitation provided for by law. The Director of Lands thereupon instituted an appeal. ISSUES:

1. WON the action filed to declare Homestead Patent No. 71852 as null and v oid was already barred by prescription. 2. WON the appellant, as the official who exercises the power to dispose pu blic lands, necessarily has the power to review the patent that pertains to him, as in the case at bar. RULING: The appellant claims that a homestead patent differs from a decree of registrati on, obtained in an ordinary registration proceeding, in many fundamental ways; t hus, depriving the former of that indefeasible nature ordinarily characteristic of the latter. This contention of the appellant is flawed because the appellant compares a homestead patent from a decree of registration when what is involved in the instant case is the indefeasibility of the certificate of title issued af ter the homestead patent has been duly ed pursuant to Section 122 of the Land Registration Act which clearly stipulates that "After due registration and issue of the certificate and owner's duplicate, such land shall be ed l and for all purpose under this act." Consequently, where a land was granted by the Government to a private individual as a homesteader under the provisions of Act No. 962, and the corresponding pat ent was ed and the certificate of title issued to the grantee, said land is considered ed within the meaning of the Land Registration Act. The t itle to the land thus granted and ed may no longer be the subject of any inquiry, decision, or judgment in a cadastral proceeding. Further, a homestead patent when ed in the corresponding of deeds is a veritable tor rens title and thus, becomes as indefeasible as a Torrens Title. For while it is true that neither the Public Land Act nor the Land Registration Act provides fo r the period within which the certificate of title to a public land grant may be questioned, this does not essentially sustains the appellant s contention that su ch action may be brought within ten years for the reason that a certificate of t itle issued pursuant to a homestead patent partakes the nature of a certificate issued as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, hence, as long as the land dis posed of is really part of the disposable land of the public domain, the same be comes indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from the date of the issuance thereof. On the appellant s contention that as the official who exercises the power to disp ose public lands, it too, bestows him the right to review a patent pertains to h im was ruled correct by the court in so far as the land remains a part of the pu blic domain and still continues to be under his exclusive and executive control. However, once the patent is ed and the corresponding certificate of tit le is issued, the land ceases to be part of the public domain and becomes privat e property over which the Director of Lands has neither control nor jurisdiction , as in the herein case. The parties, however, are not without any remedy in law for if a patent has alre ady been issued, allegedly through fraud or mistake and had been ed ther eafter; the remedy of the injured party is an action for reconveyance. The order appealed from was affirmed by the Supreme Court. INGARAN VS RAMELO, 107 PHIL. 498 (1960); FACTS: This is an appeal for the dismissal of the plaintiff s complaint for the cancellat ion of a homestead patent as per the order of the Court of First Instance of Isa bela. The complaint alleges that in 1936 Prudencio Bumanglag, plaintiffs predecessor in interest, filed a homestead application for a tract of land in Echague, Isabela , which was given due course by the defendant Director of Lands; and that after having intended to submit the final proof to a patent, the war broke out and the reafter Bumanglag s death, his heirs, herein plaintiffs, continued possession of t he land applied for and finally, on October 26, 1945, plaintiff Inocencia Ingara n filed a new homestead application for the same tract of land. Also, as alleged, in 1946 defendant Ramelo entered the land through force and de ceit and refused to vacate the land despite the letter sent by the Local Distric t Land Officer advising him to desist from his occupation of the land because Ho

mestead Application No. 217124 of Prudencio Bumanglag was still subsisting at th at time. Later on, the District Land Officer rendered a decision rejecting Bumanglag s home stead application (as renewed by plaintiff Inocencia Ingaran, his widow) and gav e due course to defendant Ramelo s application for the same land and that on Octob er 18, 1949, the Director of Lands ordered the issuance of Homestead Patent No. V-3650 in the name of Ramelo on the strength of which Original Certificate of Ti tle No. P-1004 was issued by the of Deeds of Isabela in the name of sai d Federico Ramelo. ISSUES: 1. WON the various decisions and orders of the District Land Officer of Isa bela, the Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resourc es should be declared null and void; 2. WON the plaintiff s allegations of fraud and/or mistake would prosper; 3. WON defendant Ramelo s patent and certificate of title to the land in ques tion should be cancelled. RULING: The appeal is without merit. It is not disputed that the homestead application of herein plaintiffs predecesso r in interest Prudencio Bumanglag for the land in question was rejected in a dec ision rendered by the District Land Officer at Ilagan, Isabela, on October 11, 1 947, and the application of defendant Federico Ramelo for the same tract of land was given due course but this was after the District Land Officer, upon investi gation of the conflict between the homesteaders, found that Federico Ramelo had since 1939 continuously occupied and cultivated the land, ultimately converting the entire area into a productive ricefield, without having been molested by Bum anglag or by his widow. Further, the investigation showed that Bumanglag and his widow cleared only a very insignificant portion thereof; and that the last time the spouses saw the land was in 1940, thereby practically abandoning the same. Hencetoforth, the plaintiff s action to seek a judicial review of the istrati ve decision rendered should evidently fail because it is well settled that the d ecision rendered by the Director of Lands when approved by the Secretary of Agri culture and Natural Resources is final and conclusive upon all questions of fact concerning homesteads which fall within his scope and authority, in the absence of a showing that such decision was rendered in consequence of a fraud, imposit ion or mistake other than error of judgment in estimating the value or effect of evidence. As to plaintiffs allegation of fraud or mistake, the complaint failed to state th e circumstances constituting the fraud or mistake as required by section 12 of R ule 15 of the Rules of Court. For the allegation of fraud to prosper, it should have been initially raised by the plaintiff Inocencia Ingaran in her appeal to t he Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources of the istrative case inv olving the homestead in question by alleging that there was no investigation con ducted in the case and that (she) should have then affixed her thumbmark on the alleged report or minutes of investigation, clearly stipulating that it was done thru fraud, misrepresentation and deceit. The Secretary, however, explicitly fo und that an investigation was duly conducted and that Inocencia Ingaran even sig ned the portion of the minutes of the investigation containing her testimonies. It has also been noted that, as stated in plaintiffs complaint, Homestead Patent No. V-3650 was issued to defendant Ramelo as far back as October 18, 1949 on the strength of which an original certificate of title was thereafter issued in his name. That certificate of title partakes of the nature of a certificate issued in a judicial proceeding and became indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the e xpiration of one year from the date of the issuance thereof. The present complai

nt having been filed more than 3 years after the issuance of the homestead paten t to defendant Ramelo apparently renders the lower court to be of no more jurisd iction on the matter. Finally, the annulment and cancellation of a homestead patent, as prayed for by plaintiffs, and the consequent reversion of the property to the state, are matte rs between the state and the grantee or his heirs, and until the government has taken steps to annul the grant and assert title to the homestead, the rights of the homesteader stand and must be recognized in the court of law. LOPEZ VS. PADILLA, G.R. 27559, MAY 18, 1972, 45 SCRA 44 FACTS: The late Juan Padilla, the predecessor in interest of defendants Emilio Padilla and Alberto Padilla, was the applicant of a public land under Homestead Applicat ion No. V-6992 filed with the Bureau of Lands on February 28, 1939 wherein his h eirs were subsequently issued Original Certificate of Title No. 183 which was tr anscribed in the Registration Book of the Province of Cebu pursuant to the provi sions of Section 41 of Act 496 on January 7, 1966. In the year 1958, the plaintiffs began reclaiming the area covered by the water across the shores of Mambaling, Cebu City, constructed dwellings thereon as soon as the same became tenantable, and consequently filed with the Bureau of Lands an application to lease the areas they have reclaimed, to which, they have relig iously paid the yearly rentals due from then on. The allegations in the complaint stated that said Juan Padilla and later on his heirs, defendants Padillas, obtained the approval of the Director of Lands of th eir homestead application without excluding therefrom the foreshore and marshy l ands as well as the areas reclaimed and occupied by the plaintiffs and covered b y plaintiffs' applications of lease; and that the Director of Lands approval of t he homestead application which later on led to the issuance of the homestead pat ent in favour of the defendants were done thru fraud and misrepresentation of th e defendants Padillas, without the knowledge of herein plaintiffs and without co nsulting the records of the District Land Office in the province and city of Ceb u. It has been further alleged that the late Juan Padilla and later his heirs, the defendants Padillas, pretended to the Bureau of Lands, Manila, that their Homest ead Application No. V-6992 entirely covered an area of land which they alone occ upied and cultivated, the truth of the matter being that more than half of the a rea applied by them for homestead was foreshore, marshy, and covered by the sea, and a portion of which was reclaimed and occupied by herein plaintiffs long bef ore the issuance of the patent and title in defendants' favour and hat subsequen t to the issuance of the aforesaid patent and title through fraud, deceit and mi srepresentation, defendants Padillas sold the land to defendant Edgar Woolbright in open violation of Section 118 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Com monwealth Act No. 456, as itted by Edgar Woolbright himself in his letter dat ed May 20, 1966 to the District Land Officer, Land District No. VI-I Bureau of L ands, Cebu City. Ultimately, notwithstanding the clear and lawful rights of plaintiffs over their respective lots as assigned and allocated to them by the Bureau of Lands throug h its regional office in Cebu City, Philippines, defendants conspiring and worki ng together threatened to occupy the premises in question and forcibly oust plai ntiffs from their humble homes. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the case at bar falls within the scope of the provisions of Section 38 of Act 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act. 2. Whether or not the plaintiffs are the proper parties to bring the action

. 3. Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Cebu has jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the action as well as the power to cancel the patent and title issued to the defendants on the ground of fraud. RULING: On the appellants' first issue, the lower court correctly held that "in ordinary registration proceedings involving private lands, courts may re-open proceeding s already closed by final decision or decree, only when application for review i s filed by the party aggrieved within one year from the issuance of the decree o f registration. The decree of registration then should correspond to the promulg ation of the order of the Director of Lands for the issuance of the patent and n eed not address the actual issue of the patent. The facts in record, including the Supreme Court's decision of the case in City of Cebu vs. Padilla, show that the order for the issuance of the patent for the 53,000 square meter homestead lot in question in favor of the Padillas was issue d by the Director of Lands on December 16, 1952, which was upheld by the Court e ven as against the adverse claim and opposition of the City of Cebu in said case . The sale to defendant Woolbright was made on June 2, 1966, and the present act ion was filed on June 10, 1966, therefore, the lower court correctly held that " the period within which to file the action for review of the title and to annul the sale to Woolbright has already expired," and "that the patent is deemed issu ed upon promulgation of the order of the Director of Lands for the issuance ther eof." Moving on to the appellants' second issue, the lower court likewise correctly ru led that plaintiffs could not properly institute the action for cancellation of defendants' homestead patent No. 112148 and original certificate of title No. 18 3 issued since the land clearly had ceased to be a public land and private owner ship thereof had therefore been vested in favor of defendants Padillas and their transferee Woolbright. Granting arguendo plaintiffs' allegations of fraud and d eceit against defendants and their alleged preferential right under Republic Act whic 730 to purchase the portions of the homestead lot occupied by them in 1958 h they insist should be deemed conceded for purposes of the motion to dismiss fi led by defendants-appellees section 101 of the Public Land Act vests only in the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead the authority to institute the action on behalf of the Republic for cancellation of defendants' title and for reversion of the homestead to the Government. The Supreme Court has long bef ore recognized exceptional cases wherein plaintiff-claimant has sought direct re conveyance from defendant of public land which was titled thru unlawful acts and in breach of trust, on the principle of enforcing constructive trust, but such principle is in no way applicable or invoked in the herein case. Finally, insisting that the lower court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and authority to cancel defendants' homestead patent and torrens title must nec essarily fail. As succinctly held by the lower court, the torrens title issued t o defendants in pursuance of the homestead patent is no longer susceptible to co llateral attack through the present action filed by plaintiffs, who as mere appl icants of revocable lease permits or miscellaneous applications of what is now c oncededly titled property of private ownership, have no personality or legal int erest to institute the action to begin with, more so to question the sale of the homestead, allegedly within the five-year prohibitory period of section 118 of the Public Land Act. In view of the fact that there is no showing that plaintiff s applications have been approved by the Director of Lands, taking into t hat the property has long ceased to be part of the public domain, the lower cour t, thus, correctly ruled itself to be bereft of authority to grant the relief so ught by plaintiffs-appellants on the basis of their lack of a valid cause of act ion.

HEIRS OF MALABANAN VS REPUBLIC, APRIL 29, 2009 FACTS: On February 20 1998, Mario Malabanan, petitioner, filed an application for land registration covering a parcel of land identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-4 52-D, Silang Cadastre situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite, which consist o f 71,324 square meters. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property fro m Eduardo Velazco, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open , notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years. The application was raffled to the Regional Trial Court of (RTC) CaviteTagaytay City, Branch 18. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) duly designa ted the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite, Jose Velazco, Jr., to appear on behalf of the State. Apart from presenting documentary evidence, Malabanan hi mself and his witness, Aristedes Velazco, testified at the hearing. Velazco test ified that the property originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare property own ed by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons Benedicto, Gregorio , Eduardo and Esteban the fourth being Aristedes s grandfather. Upon Lino s death, his four sons inherited the property and divided it among themselves. But by 1966, Esteban s wife, Magdalena, had become the of all the properties inhe rited by the Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the death of Esteban an d Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in istering the properties, including Lot9864-A, which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan. Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jose Velazco, Jr. did not cross-examine Ari stedes Velazco. He further manifested that he also knew the property and I affirm the truth of the testimony given by Mr. Velazco. The Republic of the Philippines likewise did not present any evidence to controvert the application. Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a 11 June 2001, issued by the Community Environment & Natural epartment of Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), he subject property was verified to be within the Alienable r Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project ed as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.

Certification dated Resources Office, D which stated that t or Disposable land pe No. 20-A and approv

On 3 December 2002, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Malabanan. The Republi c interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, stating that Malabanan had faile d to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of th e public domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in posse ssion of the property in the manner and for the length of time required by law f or confirmation of imperfect title. On February 23 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision reversing the RTC and dismissing the application of Malabanan. The appellate court noted that sin ce the CENRO-DENR certification had verified that the property was declared alie nable and disposable only on March 15 1982, the Velazcos possession pri or to that date could not be factored in the computation of the period of posses sion. ISSUE: W/N petitioners can apply for Land Registration pursuant to: a. PD 1529 Sec. 14(1) in relation with the Public Land Act Se. 48 (B) b. PD 1529 in relation with Art. 1137 of the Civil Code RULING: According to PD 1529 Sec. 14, the following persons may file in the proper

Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whethe r personally or through their duly authorized representatives: (1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of aliena ble and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownersh ip since June 12, 1945, or earlier. (2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision of existing laws. (3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds b y right of accession or accretion under the existing laws. (4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided for b y law. Where the land is owned in common, all the co-owners shall file the application tly. Where the land has been sold under pacto de retro, the vendor a retro may file a n application for the original registration of the land, provided, however, that should the period for redemption expire during the pendency of the registration proceedings and ownership to the property consolidated in the vendee a retro, t he latter shall be substituted for the applicant and may continue the proceeding s. A trustee on behalf of his principal may apply for original registration of any land held in trust by him, unless prohibited by the instrument creating the trus t. In the case at bar, it is clear that the evidence of the Petitioner is insuffici ent to establish that Malaban has acquired ownership over the subject property u nder Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioner as hi s predecessor-in-ienterest have been in possession of the property since June 12 1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioner can date back their possession ac cording to their own evidence is to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail thems elves of registration under Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree. Neither can Petitioner properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for the registrati on. While the subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that it is no longer intended for public use ser vice or for the development of the national evidence, conformably with Article 4 22 of the Civil Code. The classification of the subject property as alienable an d disposable land of the public domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusc eptible to acquisition by prescription. PAGKATIPUNAN V. CA MARCH 21 2002 FACTS: Sometime in November 1960, petitioners predecessors-in-interest, spouses Getulio Pagkatipunan and Lucrecia Esquires, filed with the Court of First Instance of Gu maca, application for judicial confirmation and registration of their title to L ots 1 and 2 of Plan Psu-174406 and Lots 1 and 2 of Plan Psu-112066, all located in San Narciso, Quezon.5 On May 4, 1961, the Court of First Instance entered an order of default against the whole world, except spouses Felicisimo Almace and Teodulo Medenilla who were given ten (10) days to file their written opposition as regards Lot No. 2 of Pl an Psu-174406. Upon motion of petitioner s predecessors, Lot No. 2 of Plan Psu-174 406 was removed from the coverage of the application. The remaining parcel of la nd covered by Lot No. 1 has an area of 3,804.261 square meters. On June 15, 1967, the Court of First Instance promulgated a decision confirming petitioners title to the property. On October 23, 1967, OCT No. O-12665 was issue d in the name of petitioners.1âwphi1.nêt Almost eighteen (18) years later, or on September 12, 1985, the Republic of the Philippines filed with the Intermediate Appellate Court an action to declare the proceedings in LRC Case No. 91-G, LRC Record No. N-19930 before the Court of Fi rst Instance of Gumaca, Quezon null and void, and to cancel Original Certificate

of Title No. 0-12665 and titles derived therefrom as null and void, to direct t he of deeds to annul said certificates of title, and to confirm the sub ject land as part of the public domain. The Republic claimed that at the time of filing of the land registration case an d of rendition of the decision on June 15, 1967, the subject land was classified as timberland under LC Project No. 15-B of San Narciso, Quezon, as shown in BF Map No. LC-1180; hence inalienable and not subject to registration. Moreover, pe titioners title thereto can not be confirmed for lack of showing of possession an d occupation of the land in the manner and for the length of time required by Se ction 48(b), Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended. Neither did petitioners have any fee simple title which may be ed under Act No. 496, as amended. Cons equently, the Court of First Instance did not acquire jurisdiction over the res and any proceedings had therein were null and void. Petitioners claim that their title to the land became incontrovertible and indef easible one (1) year after issuance of the decree of registration. Hence, the Re public s cause of action was barred by prescription and res judicata, proceedings having been initiated only after about 18 years from the time the decree of regi stration was made. Contrary to the appellate court s findings, the land is agricul tural and the inclusion and classification thereof by the Bureau of Forestry in 1955 as timberland can not impair the vested rights acquired by petitioners prede cessors-in-interest who have been in open, continuous, adverse and public posses sion of the land in question since time immemorial and for more than thirty (30) years prior to the filing of the application for registration in 1960. ISSUE: W/O CA committed grave error when it denied their motion to set aside ent ry of judgment in the land registration case contending that at the time of fili ng of the land registration case and of rendition of the decision on June 15, 19 67, the subject land was classified as timberland, hence inalienable and not sub ject to registration RULING: The CA committed grave error when it denied their motion to set aside en try of judgment in the land registration case. Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Occupatio n thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownersh ip and be ed as a title. Evidence extant on record showed that at the time of filing of the application f or land registration and issuance of the certificate of title over the disputed land in the name of petitioners, the same was timberland and formed part of the public domain, as per certification issued by the Bureau of Forest Development o n April 1, 1985. This fact was even itted by petitioners during the proceedings before the cou rt a quo on March 10, 1986, when they confirmed that the land has been classifie d as forming part of forest land, albeit only on August 25, 1955.23 Since no imp erfect title can be confirmed over lands not yet classified as disposable or ali enable, the title issued to herein petitioners is considered void ab initio.24 Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and char ged with the conservation of such patrimony. This same doctrine also states that all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are pr esumed to belong to the State.25 To overcome such presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.26 In the case at bar, there was no evidence showing that the land has been reclass ified as disposable or alienable. Before any land may be declassified from the f orest group and converted into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes, there must be a positive act from the government. Even rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply unless and until the land clas sified as forest land is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain. 27 Declassification of forest land is an express and positive act of Government. 28 It cannot be presumed. Neither should it be ignored nor deemed waived.29 It c

alls for proof.30 The court a quo found registrable title in favor of petitioners based on the Rep ublic s failure to show that the land is more valuable as forest land than for agr icultural purposes, a finding which is based on a wrong concept of what is fores t land. There is a big difference between "forest" as defined in the dictionary and "for est or timber land" as a classification of land of the public domain in the Cons titution. One is descriptive of what appears on the land while the other is a le gal status, a classification for legal purposes. The "forest land" started out a s a "forest" or vast tracts of wooded land with dense growths of trees and under brush. However, the cutting down of trees and the disappearance of virgin forest do not automatically convert the land of the public domain from forest or timbe r land to alienable agricultural land.31 The classification of forest land, or any land for that matter, is descriptive o f its legal nature or status, and does not have to be descriptive of what the la nd actually looks like.32 A person cannot enter into forest land and by the simp le act of cultivating a portion of that land, earn credits towards an eventual c onfirmation of imperfect title. The Government must first declare the forest lan d to be alienable and disposable agricultural land before the year of entry, cul tivation, and exclusive and adverse possession can be counted for purposes of an imperfect title.33 As ruled in the case of Heirs of Jose Amunategui v. Director of Forestry:34 A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose suc h classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or se a water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the l and actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is rel eased in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation o f imperfect title do not apply. Moreover, the original text of Section 48 (b), Chapter VIII of the Public Land A ct, which took effect on December 1, 1936, expressly provided that only agricult ural land of the public domain are subject to acquisitive prescription. Thus, it is clear that the applicant must prove not only his open, continuous, e xclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land either since time i mmemorial or for the period prescribed therein, but most importantly, he must pr ove that the land is alienable public land.35 In the case at bar, petitioners fa iled to do so. Petitioners contention that the Republic is now barred from questioning the valid ity of the certificate of title issued to them considering that it took the gove rnment almost eighteen (18) years to assail the same is erroneous. It is a basic precept that prescription does not run against the State.36 The lengthy occupat ion of the disputed land by petitioners cannot be counted in their favor, as it remained part of the patrimonial property of the State, which property, as state d earlier, is inalienable and indisposable.37 In light of the foregoing, the Court of Appeals did not err when it set aside th e June 15, 1967 decision of the courta quo and ordered that the subject lot be r everted back to the public domain. Since the land in question is unregistrable, the land registration court did not acquire jurisdiction over the same. Any proc eedings had or judgment rendered therein is void and is not entitled to the resp ect accorded to a valid judgment. Consequently, the Court of Appeals rightfully denied petitioners motion to set as ide the judgment rendered on December 12, 1986, in the land registration case.1âwp hi1.nêt WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 27, 1986 in AC-G.R. SP No. 07115, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

REPUBLIC VS CA AND NAGUIT Facts: On January 5, 1993, an application seeking judicial confirmation of imperfect ti tle over a land was filed with the MCTC of Ibajay-Nabas, Aklan by the respondent , Corazon Naguit. The public prosecutor, appearing for the government, and Jose Angeles, representing the heirs of Rustico Angeles, opposed the application. Upo n presentation of tax declarations of the predecessor-in-interest from 1945, the MCTC rendered a decision in favor of the respondent. The petitioner, thru the O ffice of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for reconsideration. Howeve r, the court denied the motion for reconsideration in an order dated February 18 , 1998. Thereafter, the Republic appealed the decision to the RTC. On February 2 6, 1999, the RTC rendered its decision, dismissing the appeal. The Republic elev ated the case to the Court of Appeals but was again denied. The petitioner raised the appeal to the Supreme Court contending that the Court of Appeals erred in its decision and that the respondents should not be granted of title by citing Section 14(1) of the Land Registration Decree which provides that the land be first classified as alienable and disposable before the applica nt s possession under a bona fide claim of ownership could even start. The land wa s declared disposable and alienable only on 1980, and they alleges that the resp ondent could not have maintained a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1 945, as required by Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, since prior to 1980, the land was not alienable or disposable. Petitioner suggests an interp retation of Section 14 that the alienable and disposable character of the land s hould have already been established since June 12, 1945 or earlier before a clai mant can apply. Issue: WON the appellate courts erred in their decision and WON the respondent has the right to apply for titling? Held: We found no reason to disturb the conclusion of both the RTC and the Court of Ap peals that the respondent had the right to apply for registration owing to the c ontinuous possession by her and her predecessors-in-interest of the land since 1 945. The basis of such conclusion is primarily factual, and the Court generally respects the factual findings made by lower courts. Notably, possession since 19 45 was established through proof of the existence of 50 to 60-year old trees at the time the respondent purchased the property as well as tax declarations execu ted by Urbano in 1945. Although tax declarations and realty tax payment of prope rty are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indici a of the possession in the concept of owner for no one in his right mind would b e paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. Such an act of payment strengthens one s bona fide claim of ac quisition of ownership. Considering that the possession of the subject parcel of land by the respondent can be traced back to that of her predecessors-in-interest which commenced since 1945 or for almost fifty (50) years, it can now be brought under the operation of the Torrens system. Furthermore, the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14 is that it merely requires the property sought to be ed as already alienable and disposabl e at the time the application for registration of title is filed. The respondent applied for titling after the land was declared alienable and disposable. WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs. TOMAS AVERIA, JR., V THE HONORABLE MILAGROS V. CAGUIOA FACTS: The complaint stemmed on the decision rendered by the respondent court regarding the hearing of registration proceedings of a deed of sale. The, petitioner herein, refused to participate in the said hearing , alleging th

at the respondent court, acting as a cadastral court, had no competence to act u pon the said case under Section 112 of Act 496, otherwise known as the "Land Reg istration Act." Despite of the absence of the petitioner during the hearing, the respondent court still rendered a decision ordering the registration prayed for on the basis of the evidence presented by the private respondent in the case. Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prel iminary injunction against the respondent court, based on the argument that the lower court had no competence to act on the registration sought because of the a bsence of unanimity among the parties as required under Section 112 of the Land Registration Act. ISSUE: whether or not the court has jurisdiction to order the registration of a deed of sale which is opposed on the ground of an antecedent contract to sell. HELD: While this was a correct interpretation of the aforesaid provision, the same is, however, not applicable to the instant case. The reason is that this case arose in 1982, after the Land Registration Act had been superseded by the Property Re gistration Decree, which became effective on June 11, 1979. The provision under Sec. 2 of PD. 1529 has eliminated the distinction between th e general jurisdiction vested in the regional trial court and the limited jurisd iction conferred upon it by the former law when acting merely as a cadastral cou rt. Aimed at avoiding multiplicity of suits, the change has simplified registrat ion proceedings by conferring upon the regional trial courts the authority to ac t not only on applications for original registration but also over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and determine al l questions arion such applications or petitions. Since it appeared that the respondent court proceeded to hear the case and arriv ed at its decision after considering only the evidence of the private respondent and without regard to the evidence of the petitioner, the SC held that the deci sion of the respondent court is to be set aside and a new trial of Cadastral Cas e is to be held whereby the petitioner, as well as other interested parties, sha ll be given the opportunity to be heard. Republic vs Diloy (August 26, 2008) FACTS: As early as 1948, Crispin Leaban had already declared the subject property for t axation purposes under his name, as evidenced by Tax Declaration (T.D.) No. 2708 . He was then succeeded by his son, Eusebio Leaban, who filed the following T.D. Nos.5 4501, 3710 and 2855 in his name from the period covering the years 1951-1 969. Thereafter, in 1974, the subject property was transferred to Eusebio Leaban 's daughter, Pacencia Leaban, who, in turn, declared the same for taxation purpo ses under her name. It was evidenced by T.D. Nos. 8672, 7282 and 6231. On 15 Jun e 1979, the subject property was then conveyed by Pacencia Leaban to her daughte r, herein respondent Gregoria L. Diloy, by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale. In 1997, respondent Gregoria L. Diloy, now married to Joselito C. Espiritu, file d an Application8 for Registration of Title over the subject property under Sect ion 14 of Presidential Decree No. 15299 before the 2nd MCTC of Silang-Amadeo, Si lang, Cavite. The subject property was particularly described as Lot No. 2280, C ad-482-D, Amadeo Cadastre, Ap-04-010073, with an area of 22,249 square meters lo cated in Barangay Dagatan, Amadeo, Cavite. To establish the jurisdictional requirements required by the aforesaid law, the respondent submitted and marked the following documents, to wit: (1) Application for Registration as Exhibits "A"; "A-1" to "A-4";10 (2) Notice of Initial Heari ng dated 17 July 1997 as Exhibits "B" and "B-1";11 (3) Certificate of Publicatio n12 by the Land Registration Authority (LRA) as Exhibit "C" and Certificate of N otification13by the LRA as Exhibit "C-1"; (4) Certificate of Publication issued by the National Printing Office(NPO) as Exhibit "D"14 and a copy of the Official

Gazette (O.G.), Volume 93, No. 39, 29 September 199715 as Exhibits "D-1" to "D3"; (5) Affidavit of Publication16 issued by the We Forum newspaper17 as Exhibit s "E", "E-1" and "E-1-A"; (6) Registry Receipts sent to the government agencies concerned as well as to the ading owners as Exhibits "F," "F-1" to "F-16," i nclusive; and (7) Certificate of Posting18 as Exhibit "G." Since the Public Prosecutor did not interpose any objection, the court a quo itted the aforementioned Exhibits. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), however, on behalf of the Republic, f iled an Opposition to the aforesaid Application for Registration of Title. It fi led a Notice of Appearance, but in a letter dated 18 November 1997, deputized th e Provincial Prosecutor of Silang, Cavite, to represent its interest therein. During the hearing of the Application for Registration of Title, respondent pres ented her father, Rustico Diloy, and Armando Ramos as witnesses to strengthen he r claim that her predecessors-in-interest had been in actual, continuous, open, notorious and adverse possession of the subject property. Rustico Diloy testified that the first time he came to know of the subject prope rty was in 1952 when he was twenty years old, because he used to work on the sai d property. When he married Pacencia Leaban, the owner of the subject property w as Eusebio Leaban, the father of Pacencia Leaban. Said property was inherited by his wife from her father. It then came to the possession of the respondent by v irtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale executed between her and her mother, Pacencia L eaban. According to him, from the time he came to know of the subject property u p to the present, it was continuously declared for taxation purposes. He also af firmed that the subject property has an area of 22,249 square meters, and it is located in Barangay Dagatan, Amadeo, Cavite. He came to know of said information because he was the one who had it surveyed. The survey of the land was made and approved by the Director of Lands and reapproved by the Bureau of Lands. The su bject property was fenced with barbed wire and shrubs.23 To corroborate the testimony of Rustico Diloy, Armando Ramos, 81 years old and p resently residing in Barangay Dagatan, Amadeo, Cavite, stated that he was the ow ner of the land ading the subject property, and that he knew the previous ow ners of the same. He disclosed that he knew the subject property even before the Japanese Occupation because he became the husband of one of the heirs of the ow ner thereof. Prior to the Japanese Occupation, he said the owner of the subject property was his father-in-law, Narciso Leaban. Then, in 1948, Crispin Leaban ca me into the possession of said land. From Crispin Leaban, he confirmed that the subject property was inherited by Eusebio Leaban, the son of Crispin Leaban. Eus ebio Leaban, in turn, transferred the same to his daughter, Pacencia Leaban. The n, in 1979, Pacencia Leaban conveyed the subject property to her daughter, the r espondent, who is the present owner of the subject property where she plants cof fee. The Republic persistently argues that the respondent's Application for Registrat ion of Title should have been denied because the latter failed to comply with th e period of possession required by law, i.e., Section 14 of Presidential Decree No. 1529. The Republic reveals that the subject property was only declared alien able and disposable on 15 March 1982 per Forestry istration Office (FAO) No . 4-1650. From 1982 when the property was declared alienable and disposable to 1 997, the respondent had only been in adverse possession of the subject property for a period of 15 years. Thus, there was no compliance with Section 14, Preside ntial Decree No. 1529 because the subject property was not yet alienable and dis posable on 12 June 1945, and respondent's possession lacked the required number of years (30 years) for her to acquire the same through prescription. Hence, res pondent did not acquire an imperfect title, which may be confirmed through a jud icial proceeding. The MCTC rendered a Decision in favor of the respondent, thereby granting her ap plication for registration over the subject property. Republic then filed a Motion for Reconsideration the said Motion for Reconsidera tion was denied. As a result thereof, the Republic appealed the Decision of the MCTC to the Court of Appeals.

Court of Appeals denied the appeal of the Republic and affirmed the Decision of the MCTC granting the application for registration of the subject property. Aggrieved, the Republic filed a motion for the reconsideration of the aforesaid Decision which was likewise denied in a Resolution dated 30 August 2006. Hence, this Petition. ISSUE: whether or not the respondent has acquired a registrable title No, respondent has acquired a registrable title. Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree speaks of who may apply for regis tration of land. The said provisions of law refer to an original registration th rough ordinary registration proceedings.31 It specifically provides: SEC. 14. Who may apply. - The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] an application for registration of tit le to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives: (1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of aliena ble and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownersh ip since June 12, 1945, or earlier. (Emphasis supplied.) The three requisites for the filing of an application for registration of title under the first category are: (1) that the property in question is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; (2) that the applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation; and (3) that such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier.32 In effect, the pe riod of possession - open, continuous, exclusive and notorious - must at least b e 30 years computed from 12 June 1945 to the effectivity of Presidential Decree No. 1529 on 11 June 1978. Section 14(1) of the aforesaid law requires that the property sought to be regis tered is already alienable and disposable at the time the application for regist ration of title is filed. In the case at bar, it is beyond question that the subject property was already an alienable and disposable land at the time the Application for Registration of Title over the same was filed by the respondent. The Application for Registrati on of Title over the subject property was filed by the respondent in the year 19 97. The Report,34 dated 27 July 1998, submitted by the Director of Lands and the Certification,35 dated 4 May 1998, issued by the CENRO, clearly established tha t the subject property was already within the alienable and disposable zone as c lassified under Project No. 5, L.C. Map No. 3013 as early as 15 March 1982 per F orestry istration Order No. 4-1650.36Even the parties to this case, particu larly the OSG, did not refute the fact that at the time the Application for Regi stration of Title was filed, the subject property had already been classified as alienable and disposable land. Both lower courts upheld that the respondent was able to prove that her possessi on of the subject property was open, continuous, exclusive and notorious for mor e than 30 years While this Court agrees with the lower courts that, indeed, respondent's possess ion of the subject property was open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, howev er, we hold that respondent failed to prove that she or her predecessors-in-inte rest were already in possession of the subject property under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier, which is the reckoning period specif ically provided in Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529. From 1982 up to 1997, the year the respondent filed an Application for Registrat ion of Title over the subject property, the respondent was in possession of the same for only 15 years, which was short of another 15 years from the 30-year-per iod possession requirement. Thus, this Court is constrained to abide by the Lati n maxim "Dura lex sed lex."42 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Deci sion and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 7 February 2006 and 30 August 2006, respectively affirming the Decision of the MCTC dated 5 May 1999, which gr anted the respondent's Application for Registration of Title over the subject pr operty, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The respondent's Application for Regi

stration of Title over the subject property is hereby DENIED. Republic vs Bibonia (June 21, 2007) FACTS: On September 1, 1994, Cheryl B. Bibonia, respondent, and Ricardo L. Fernandez, substituted by Joselito G. Manahan, also a respondent, filed with the RTC an app lication for registration of two parcels of land, docketed as LRA Record No. N-6 1762. Respondent Bibonia s application covers Lot 1, while that of respondent Manahan co vers Lot 2. Both lots, included in Plan Psu-05-006012, are located in Vinzons, C amarines Norte. Respondent Bibonia alleged in her application that she bought Lot 1 from Marita King as shown by a Deed of Absolute Sale dated September 29, 1992. Marita, in tu rn, received the property from her father, Mariano Morales, by virtue of a Deed of Donation Inter Vivos dated November 23, 1987. Morales, on the other hand, pur chased the same lot from Sisenando Barco who, in turn, bought it from Restituto Paraon on September 10, 1955. For his part, Ricardo L. Fernandez, substituted by respondent Manahan, alleged i n the same application that he bought Lot 2 on September 29, 1992 from Remedios Cribe. It was donated to the latter by her father, Mariano Morales, on December 18, 1987, who purchased the same lot from Basilia Barco and the heirs of Liberat o Salome on July 31, 1968. In the course of the proceedings, or on August 3, 1995, the trial court ordered the substitution of Fernandez by respondent Manahan, the former having transferr ed his rights and interest over Lot 2 in favor of the latter by virtue of a Deed of Assignment dated May 25, 1995. In its Decision, dated September 17, 1996, the trial court granted respondents ap plication for registration. On appeal by the Republic of the Philippines, herein petitioner, the Court of Ap peals, in a Decision4 dated February 28, 2003, affirmed in toto the trial court s judgment. Petitioner Republic contends, among others, that the Court of Appeals erred when it departed from settled jurisprudence by ruling that respondents have occupied the lots for thirty (30) years; and that they could not have maintained a bona fide claim of ownership because at the time of the filing of their application o n September 1, 1994, the lots had been alienable for only eight (8) years, per C ertification from the Community and Environment Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). ISSUES: I. Whether respondents were able to prove that the lots subject of their ap plication were then disposable and alienable land of the public domain; and II. Whether they were able to show that they have been in open, exclusive, c ontinuous and notorious possession of the lots in the concept of owners. RULING: I. Yes, respondents were able to prove that the lots subject of their appli cation were then disposable and alienable land of the public domain Applicants for registration of land must prove: (a) that it forms part of the al ienable lands of the public domain; and (b) that they have been in open, exclusi ve, continuous and notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership either since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945. Relative to the first requisite, it is undisputed that the subject lots have bee n declared as alienable and disposable by a positive government act. The evidenc e on record shows that a Certification6 was issued by the CENRO, DENR to the eff ect that the lots are "within Camarines Norte Project No. 4-E, alienable and dis posable area, certified as such on January 17, 1986." The more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires t he property sought to be ed as already alienable and disposable at the t ime the application for registration of title is filed. If the State, at the tim

e the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still r eserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its owne rship in the State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in g ood faith. However, if the property has already been classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on the pa rt of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property. (Emphas is ours) Here, when respondents filed their application in 1994, the lots were already de clared alienable and disposable by the DENR 49 years ago, or in 1945. II. No, they were able to show that they have been in open, exclusive, cont inuous and notorious possession of the lots in the concept of owners. As to the second requisite, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that respondents were able to prove, through testimonial and documentary evidenc e, that they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, exclusive, co ntinuous and notorious possession of the lots for the period required by law. In the present case, applicants-appellees predecessors-in-interest have been in o pen, continuous, exclusive possession of the disputed land as early as 1955, thu s, they only stepped into the shoes of their predecessors-in-interest and by vir tue thereof, acquired all the legal rights necessary to confirm what would other wise be deemed as an imperfect title. Although respondents possession and that of their predecessors-in-interest was mo re than 39 years when they filed their application for registration in 1994, tha t period of possession will not suffice for purposes of registration of title. W hat is required is open, exclusive, continuous and notorious possession by respo ndents and their predecessors-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of ownership, since June 12, 1945 or earlier.10 Much as we want to conform to the State s polic y of encouraging and promoting the distribution of alienable public lands to spu r economic growth and remain true to the ideal of social justice, our hands are tied by the law s stringent safeguards against ing imperfect titles. WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated Feb ruary 28, 2003 in CA-G.R. CV No. 54874 affirming in toto the Decision dated Sept ember 17, 1996 of the RTC, Branch 39, Daet, Camarines Norte in Land Registration Case No. N-775 (LRA Record No. N-61762) is REVERSED. Respondents application for registration of title is DENIED. Director of Lands v. CA (106 SCRA 426) These are separate appeals of the parties via certiorari seeking to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals granting the application for confirmation and r egistration of title of Natividad Aliño, substituted by her heirs, to five (5) par cels of land, with an area of 377,216 square meters, situated at Mamburao, Occid ental Mindoro. FACTS: "On December 16, 1976, Maria Natividad Aliño filed L. R. C. No. N-72 seeking the r egistration of five parcels of land containing an aggregate area of 37,7216 hect ares under the Land Registration Act and/or Section 48(b), Chapter VIII of Act 1 41 as amended in lieu of a previous application docketed as L.R.C. Case No. N-67 which was ordered amended by the Court. "In her application Maria Natividad Aliño claims that she is the owner in fee simp le of the parcels of land situated at Sitio Tagun, Barrio of Taguan, Municipalit y of Mamburao, Province of Occidental Mindoro. "She further asserts that the aforesaid parcels of land are covered by Tax Decla ration No. 262; that, applicant being the only surviving daughter of Patricio Al iño obtained her title over the said parcels of land by way of inheritance from he r father; that, applicant has exclusive possession of said parcels of land and, together with her predecessor-in-interest, her possession is peaceful, continuou s, public and adverse to the whole world and in the concept of an owner since ti me immemorial, i.e. even prior to 1890; that they have used the said parcels of land for residential and agricultural purposes up to the present time.

"Maria Natividad Aliño s application was opposed by Attorney Amando Y. Azul, Honofre Cobarrubias, Estanislao Temenia, Benigno Olleres, the Bureau of Forest Developm ent and the Republic of the Philippines. "Oppositor Amando Y. Azul, claims that he is the actual occupant of a parcel of land containing an area of eight (8) hectares more or less which is included in the application for title under LRC No. N-72; that, he acquired the said parcel of land from a certain Estanislao Temenia, who was the previous occupant for mor e than thirty (30) years; that, he has caused the survey of the land which was r ecorded as Psu-230336, which is pending approval before the Bureau of Lands; tha t, he has commenced occupying the said land since 1963, continuously up to the p resent without having been molested, disturbed or questioned by anyone, includin g registration applicant; and, that applicant Maria Natividad Aliño has never set foot in the area covered by his opposition nor introduced a single improvement t herein. Attorney Amando Y. Azul, therefore, prays that the application for regis tration be denied so far as it includes the eight (8) hectares he has actually o ccupied and improved. "Oppositor Honofre Cobarrubias, for his part avers that the application for regi stration includes a parcel of land with an area of six (6) hectares more or less situated at sitio Ligang, barrio of San Luis, Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, whi ch parcel of land he has actually occupied and improved without having been mole sted, disturbed or questioned by anyone, including the registration applicant, s ince 1958 when he purchased said land from Mr. Estanislao Temenia; that, at the time of the sale in his favor the said land has been fully cultivated to upland riceland by the vendor whose occupation has been open, peaceful, adverse and in the concept of an owner since the last thirty years; and, that applicant Maria N atividad Aliño has never set foot in the area covered by his opposition nor introd uced a single improvement therein. Honofre Cobarrubias, therefore, prays that th e registration application be dismissed in so far as it affects the area of six (6) hectares which he owns. "Oppositor Benigno Olleres contends that he is the actual physical possessor of a parcel of agricultural land situated in Sitio Taguan, Barrio San Luis, Mambura o, Occidental Mindoro embraced under the plans submitted by the applicant, with an area of more or less 17,7759 hectares declared for taxation purposes under Ta x Declaration No. 1547 in his name; that, he has possessed the said property ope nly, publicly, continuously and adversely against the whole world and under a bo na fide claim of acquisition of ownership by himself and his predecessor-in-inte rest for more than thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the ins tant application without having been disturbed by anybody much less the applican t, except only sometime June of 1977 when a certain Conrado Alvarez, alleged car etaker of the applicant tried to gain a foothold on his property, resulting in h is filing of a Forcible Entry case against said Conrado Alvarez, which case is s till pending trial in the lower court of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro; that, whe n he first entered the land it was forested and cogonal and thereafter, he has u prooted the trees thereon, planted fruit trees and has converted a portion of th e same to an irrigated field; that, he has been religiously paying the taxes due the government for the land subject of his opposition. Benigno Olleres, thus, p rays that the application be dismissed and the land subject of his opposition be decreed in his favor. (pp. 83-84, Records) "Oppositor Estanislao Temenia, alleges that he is the actual and physical posses sor of a parcel of agricultural land situated at Sitio Taguan, Barrio San Luis, Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, with an area of 154,460 square meter; that, he inh erited the said parcel of land from his parents and that he and his predecessors -in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession a nd occupation thereof since the time immemorial under a bonafide claim of acquis ition of ownership without being disturbed by anybody; that, he has declared the said parcel of land for taxation purposes lunder Tax Declaration No. 2411; that , the said land was still a primeval virgin land when he and his predecessors-in -interest first set foot on it, which thereafter they converted into a rich agri cultural land; that, the aforesaid parcel of land is included in the land sought to be ed by herein applicant under plans Psu-04-005173, Psu-4A-000231,

Psu-4A-000232, Psu-04-000233; that, Maria Natividad Aliño has never taken possessi on of the land which are objects of her application whether actual or constructi ve and therefore, not entitled to a able right over the same. Estanislao Temenia therefore prays that the application for registration with regard to th e parcels of land subject of his opposition be denied and that he be declared th e lawful possessor thereof. "As for the Bureau of Forestry, psray that the application for registration with regard to the lands subject of their opposition be denied and that the same be declared part of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines. "Finally, for its part the Republic of the Philippines, opposes Maria Natividad Aliños application on the following grounds: "1. That neither the applicant/s nor his/her/their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto (Sec. 48 (b), C.A. 141 , as amended by P. D. 1073); "2. That the muniment/s of title and/or the tax declaration/s and tax payment/s receipt/s of applicant/s if any, attached to or alleged in the application, do/e s not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the lands applied for, or of his/her/their open, continuous, exclusive and noto rious possession and occupation thereof, in the concept of owner, since June 12, 1945, or prior thereto. Said muniment/s of title do/es not appear to be genuine and the tax declaration/s and/or tax payment receipts indicate the pretended po ssession of applicant/s to be of recent vintage; "3. That the claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of Spanish Title or g rant can no longer be availed of by the applicant/s who have failed to file an a ppropriate application for registration within the period of six (6) months from February 16, 1976 as required by Presidential Decree No. 892. From the records, it appears that the instant application was filed on December 16, 1976. "5. That the parcel/s applied for is/are portions of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines not subject to private appropriation." Meantime, the original applicant, Natividad Garcia Aliño, died on May 26, 1985, an d was substituted by her heirs Nieves, Elisa, Bienvenido, Antonio, Renato and Le onardo, all surnamed Aliño-Buhay.2 "After trial, on September 17, 1990, the court a quo rendered the assailed decis ion, which in part states: "Documentary evidence presented consists of the application requisites from stag e to stage, until the application was filed, on December 16, 1976, Survey Plans, Technical Descriptions, Tax Receipts, and Certificates of Ownership of Large Ca ttle. "The individual oppositors likewise submitted Tax Declarations and Tax Receipts and copies of deed of sale. "The pleadings, the evidence on file as above outlined and all the papers of rec ord now render it justifiable to maintain oppositor-parties in possession of the areas claimed by them. An additional ground for this exists with regard to thos e cases where some papers have been filed with the Bureau of Lands. (Atty. Arman do Azul and Honofre Cobarrubias) ISUUE: Whether respondent heirs of Natividad Aliño have able title as owne rs of the five (5) parcels of land applied for with an area of 377,216 square me ters, situated at sitio Tagum, Barrio Taguan, Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro. RULING: No the respondent heirs of Natividad Aliño have able title as owners of th e five (5) parcels of land applied for with an area of 377,216 square meters, si tuated at sitio Tagum, Barrio Taguan, Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro. An applicant seeking to establish ownership of land must conclusively show that he is the owner in fee simple,7 for the standing presumption is that all lands belong to the State, unless acquired from the Government either by purchase or b y grant, except lands possessed by an occupant and his predecessors since time i mmemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had n ever been part of the public domain or that it had been private property even be

fore the Spanish conquest. "The standing presumption, we must not forget, is that land pertains to the Stat e, and any person seeking to establish ownership over land must conclusively sho w that he is the owner." In this case, the land in question is ittedly public.1âwphi1 Neither the applic ant Natividad Aliño nor her predecessors in interests had any title or grant from the Spanish sovereign not even an imperfect or incomplete title and the only basis o f her claim of ownership is possession allegedly since time immemorial. Nonetheless, applicant anchors her application for registration on the provision s of Act No. 496, or in the alternative Com. Act No. 141, Section 48 (b), as ame nded by Rep. Act No. 1942, which allows "those who by themselves or through thei r predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notoriou s possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty years immediatel y preceding the filing of the application" to apply for judicial confirmation an d registration of title.10 However, applicant and her predecessors in interests had not been in open, conti nuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land in question, under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, immediately preceding the filing of the application. Analyzing the evidence submitted, we note that the applicant failed to prove the fact of possession by herself and her predecessors in interest since June 12, 1 945 before the filing of the application. Applicant failed to prove specific acts showing the nature of the possession of her predecessors in interest. "Actual possession of land consists in the manifes tation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally e xercise over his own property."11 "The applicant must present specific acts of o wnership to substantiate the claim and cannot just offer general statements whic h are mere conclusions of law than factual evidence of possession."12 The bare assertion of witnesses that the applicant of land had been in the open, adverse and continuous possession of the property for over thirty (30) years is hardly "the well-nigh incontrovertible" evidence required in cases of this natu re.13 Facts constituting possession must be duly established by competent eviden ce.14 In fact, applicant s possession over subject parcels of land was contradicted by s everal oppositors, who claimed that they were in open exclusive, adverse and con tinuous possession of the areas respectively claimed by them, and said parcels o f land were personally cultivated by them. The land applied for even encroached on the pasture land of Mary Y. Azul.1âwphi1 While it may be true that applicant purchased the subject property in 1913, the same could not have ripened into ownership because only fourteen (14) years ther eafter, portions of the land were classified as forest land. The possession of f orest land, however long, never confers title upon the possessor because the sta tute of limitations with regard to public land does not ran against the State, u nless the occupant can prove a grant from the State.16 WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. C V No. 30605, DENIES the application for registration filed by applicant Nativida d Aliño, substituted by her heirs Nieves, Elisa, Bienvenido, Antonio, Renato and L eonardo, all surnamed Aliño-Buhay, and declares the subject parcels of land to be public lands belonging to the State. Llanes vs Republic (November 27, 2008) Herein petitioners, Spouses Llanes, applied for a registration of their title over a parcel of land as Lot No. 5812 of Plan AP-04-009967, Malvar Cadastr e, with an area of 4,014 sq. meters, located in San Juan, Malvar, Batangas (subj ect property). The said property has been in the possession of Gabriel Llanes gra ndmother, Eugenia for 30 years. In 1965, Gabriel s brother, Servillano Llanes, pur chased the subject property from Eugenia, the subject property was then sold to the present petitioners spouses on December 29, 1995. The said transaction was e

videnced by a Kasulatan ng Bilihan, Eugenia, Servillano and the petitioners reli giously paid tax declarations to the property. In 1996, however, the Spouses Llanes conveyed the subject property to IC TSI Warehousing, Inc. (ICTSI), by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale. However, th e sale between the Lllanes and ICTSI cannot push through because the name of the tax declarations was still on the spouses and could not be transferred to the I CTSI. Hence, there was a need to amend the application for registration of tit le to substitute ICTSI with the Spouses Llanes as party applicants. In an order by the RTC granted the Motion with Leave of Court to Amend Application for Regi stration of Title and itted the Amended Application for Registration of Title , thus substituting the Spouses Llanes as the party applicants in LRC Case No. T -349. On 10 July 2003, the MCTC rendered a Decision granting the Application f or Registration of Title of the Spouses Llanes. Unsatisfied with the aforesaid D ecision, the Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the MCTC er red in granting the Application for Registration of Title of the Spouses Llanes. On 31 January 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision granting the app eal of the Republic, setting aside the MCTC Decision dated 10 July 2003, and dis missing the Application for Registration of Title of the Spouses Llanes. Hence, this petition. ISSUE Whether or not Tax Declarations are proof of ownership? Held: While tax declarations and receipts are not incontrovertible evidence of ownersh ip, they constitute, at the least, proof that the holder has a claim of title ov er the property. Tax declarations are good indicia of possession in the concept of an owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property t hat is not in his actual or constructive possession. Moreover, while tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of own ership and do not prove title to the land, nevertheless, when coupled with actua l possession, they constitute evidence of great weight and can be the basis of a claim of ownership through prescription. To the Court, therefore, the Spouses Llanes were able to sufficiently discharge the burden of proof that they have an imperfect title to the subject property ca pable of judicial confirmation. Thus the court rendered the petition granting the application for registration o f title to the subject property of the Spouses Gabriel and Maria Llanes, is here by REINSTATED. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v CA FACTS: On January 8, 1991, Tabangao Realty, Inc. filed an application for Original Regi stration of Title over three parcels of land, more particularly described as fol lows: Plan Ap-4A-001136, containing an area of 4,596 square meters, situate * Lot 9895 d in the Barrio of Tabangao, City of Batangas; * Lot 10155 Plan Ap-4A-001221, containing an area of 4, 031 square meters, situa ted in the Barrio of Libjo, City of Batangas; * Lot 10171 Plan Ap-4A-001157, containing an area of 8,224 square meters, situat ed in the Barrio of Tabangao, City of Batangas. Applicant Tabangao Realty, Inc. alleged in its application that it acquired the above-mentioned lots by purchase from its previous owners as evidenced by the co rresponding Deeds of Sale;that it is the owner of all ading lots; that it ha d been in actual possession of the lots since the time it acquired the same from

the previous owners up to the present; and that its possession and occupation a s owners including that of its predecessor-in-interest has been open, peaceful, continuous, adverse to the whole world and in the concept of an owner. Applicant Tabangao Realty, Inc. attached to its application its Articles of Inco rporation, the tracing cloth plan of the lots, blue print copies of said plan, t echnical descriptions of the lots, Deeds of Sale, Assessment Certificate, Tax De clarations for the three lots and Tax Clearances. On August 12, 1991, the application was ordered archived by the Regional Trial C ourt for the applicant s failure to comply with the requirements called for in the Report dated February 22, 1994 by the Office of the Land Registration Authority . On June 2, 1994, the applicant filed a motion to revive the application and to s et the case for initial hearing. The motion was granted by the Regional Trial Co urt on June 7, 1994 and initial hearing was set on September 1994. On the basis of all the evidence presented, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision on March 31, 1995 granting the application for registration. In due tim e, petitioner appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals. On July 30, 1997, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision affirming the ap pealed decision. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Tabangao Realty, Inc. has able title over thre e (3) parcels of land situated in Tabangao, Batangas City applied for. RULING: The issue raised is whether respondent Tabangao Realty, Inc. has able ti tle over three (3) parcels of land situated in Tabangao, Batangas City applied f or. The Court of Appeals ruled that the applicant Tabangao Realty, Inc. is entitled to registration of title over the three (3) parcels of land applied for. The rul ing is erroneous. An applicant seeking to establish ownership over land must conclusively show tha t he is the owner thereof in fee simple, for the standing presumption is that al l lands belong to the public domain of the State, unless acquired from the Gover nment either by purchase or by grant, except lands possessed by an occupant and his predecessors since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the pr esumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been private property even before the Spanish conquest. The land in question is ittedly public. The applicant has no title at all. It s claim of acquisition of ownership is solely based on possession. In fact, the parcels of land applied for were declared public land by decision of the Cadastr al Court. Such being the case, the application for voluntary registration under P. D. No. 1529 is barred by the prior judgment of the Cadastral Court. The land having been subjected to compulsory registration under the Cadastral Act and dec lared public land can no longer be the subject of registration by voluntary appl ication under Presidential Decree No. 1529. The second application is barred by res-judicata. As previously held, "[W]here the applicant possesses no title or o wnership over the parcel of land, he cannot acquire one under the Torrens System of registration.

Applicant failed to prove specific acts showing the nature of its possession and that of its predecessors in interest. The applicant must present specific acts of ownership to substantiate the claim and cannot just offer general statements which are mere conclusions of law than factual evidence of possession. Actual po ssession of land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of su ch a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property. The bare assertion of witnesses that the applicant of land had been in the open, adverse and continuous possession of the property for over thirty (30) years is hardly "the well-nigh incontrovertible" evidence required in cases of this natu re. In other words, facts constituting possession must be duly established by co mpetent evidence. the Court REVERSES the decision of the Court of Appeals, DENIES the application for registration of title filed by applicant Tabangao Realty, Inc. and declares the subject parcels of land to be public land belonging to the public domain.